SARCENO v. MiMA LLC (2024)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant MiMA Tower Associates, LLC, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Mark I. Partnow, J.), dated June 24, 2021.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of that defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend the complaint to add The Related Companies, L.P., and 42nd and 10th Associates, LLC, as defendants.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the defendant MiMA Tower Associates, LLC (hereinafter MiMA), to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained in June 2016 while performing demolition work at premises located in Manhattan.  The complaint asserted causes of action sounding in common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241.  Prior to the completion of discovery, MiMA moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.  The plaintiff opposed the motion on the ground that summary judgment was premature and cross-moved for leave to amend the complaint to add The Related Companies, L.P. (hereinafter The Related Companies), and 42nd and 10th Associates, LLC (hereinafter 42nd and 10th Associates), the alleged landlord of the subject property, as defendants.  In an order dated June 24, 2021, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of MiMA's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, without prejudice to renew upon the completion of discovery, and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend the complaint.  MiMA appeals.

Contrary to MiMA's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, without prejudice to renew upon the completion of discovery.  “A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant” (Cajas–Romero v. Ward, 106 A.D.3d 850, 852, 965 N.Y.S.2d 559;  see Tarasiuk v. Levoritz, 216 A.D.3d 1031, 1035, 189 N.Y.S.3d 681).  “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Haidhaqi v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 153 A.D.3d 1328, 1329, 62 N.Y.S.3d 408;  see Cenlar FSB v. Tenenbaum, 172 A.D.3d 806, 807, 101 N.Y.S.3d 68).  Here, the plaintiff demonstrated that discovery might lead to relevant evidence that would justify opposition to that branch of MiMA's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it (see Tarasiuk v. Levoritz, 216 A.D.3d at 1035, 189 N.Y.S.3d 681;  Johnson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 185 A.D.3d 800, 801, 125 N.Y.S.3d 587).

The plaintiff sought leave to amend the complaint to add The Related Companies and 42nd and 10th Associates as defendants pursuant to the relation-back doctrine (see Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d 173, 177, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978;  Leung v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 204 A.D.3d 654, 655, 165 N.Y.S.3d 138).  “The relation-back doctrine allows a party to be added to an action after the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the claim is deemed timely interposed, if (1) the claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, (2) the additional party is united in interest with the original party, and (3) the additional party knew or should have known that but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against the additional party as well” (Bumpus v. New York City Tr. Auth., 66 A.D.3d 26, 35, 883 N.Y.S.2d 99;  see Leung v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 204 A.D.3d at 655, 165 N.Y.S.3d 138).  “The ‘linchpin’ of the relation-back doctrine is whether the new defendant had notice within the applicable limitations period” (Alvarado v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 60 A.D.3d 981, 982, 876 N.Y.S.2d 147;  see Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d at 180, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978;  Uddin v. A.T.A. Constr. Corp., 164 A.D.3d 1400, 1401, 83 N.Y.S.3d 602).

Here, MiMA does not dispute that the first and third prongs of the relation-back doctrine were established.  The plaintiff also established the second prong of the relation-back doctrine, i.e., that MiMA is united in interest with The Related Companies and 42nd and 10th Associates.  The plaintiff's submissions sufficiently demonstrated that, under the particular circumstances presented, MiMA, The Related Companies, and 42nd and 10th Associates, “ ‘intentionally or not, often blurred the distinction between them’ ” (Uddin v. A.T.A. Constr. Corp., 164 A.D.3d at 1401, 83 N.Y.S.3d 602, quoting Donovan v. All–Weld Prods. Corp., 34 A.D.3d 257, 257, 824 N.Y.S.2d 44;  see Wilson v. Rye Family Realty, LLC, 218 A.D.3d 836, 193 N.Y.S.3d 274).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend the complaint to add The Related Companies and 42nd and 10th Associates as defendants.

The plaintiff's remaining contention is without merit.

BARROS, J.P., WOOTEN, WARHIT and VENTURA, JJ., concur.