LEGAL SERVICING LLC v. GOMEZ (2024)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to set aside a transfer of certain real property as a fraudulent conveyance, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Diccia T. Pineda–Kirwan, J.), entered March 21, 2022.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the defendants’ motion to vacate a judgment of the same court entered September 14, 2021, after a nonjury trial, which is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, among other things, setting aside the subject transfer.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to set aside a transfer of certain real property as a fraudulent conveyance.  After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court issued a judgment, among other things, setting aside the subject transfer.  The defendants moved to vacate the judgment.  In an order entered March 21, 2022, the court, inter alia, denied the motion.  The defendants appeal.

Pursuant to CPLR 5015(a), a court that rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, upon the grounds of excusable default;  newly discovered evidence;  fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;  lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order;  or reversal, modification, or vacatur of a prior judgment or order upon which it is based (see Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 62, 68, 760 N.Y.S.2d 727, 790 N.E.2d 1156;  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Dev, 176 A.D.3d 691, 692, 110 N.Y.S.3d 127).  “In addition to the grounds set forth in [CPLR] 5015(a), a court may vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” (Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d at 68, 760 N.Y.S.2d 727, 790 N.E.2d 1156;  see Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 22 N.Y.3d 220, 226, 980 N.Y.S.2d 880, 3 N.E.3d 1128;  Vargas v. New York City Tr. Auth., 206 A.D.3d 783, 784, 167 N.Y.S.3d 844).  However, “[a] court's inherent power to exercise control over its judgments is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party from judgments taken through [fraud,] mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” (Matter of McKenna v. County of Nassau, Off. of County Attorney, 61 N.Y.2d 739, 742, 472 N.Y.S.2d 913, 460 N.E.2d 1348 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Dev, 176 A.D.3d at 692–693, 110 N.Y.S.3d 127;  CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Maldonado, 171 A.D.3d 1007, 1008, 98 N.Y.S.3d 607).

Here, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion to vacate the judgment.  The defendants failed to articulate a basis for vacating the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) and failed to provide any evidence of fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect that would warrant vacatur in the interest of substantial justice (see CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Maldonado, 171 A.D.3d at 1009, 98 N.Y.S.3d 607;  Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Russo, 167 A.D.3d 913, 915, 91 N.Y.S.3d 122).

We decline the plaintiff's request to impose sanctions against the defendants for prosecuting an allegedly frivolous appeal (see 22 NYCRR 130–1.1).

The plaintiff's remaining contention is without merit.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, GENOVESI and WARHIT, JJ., concur.