IN RE: Vincenia Lee HART (2024)

DECISION & JUDGMENT

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York City Housing Authority dated August 16, 2019.  The determination adopted the recommendation of a hearing officer dated June 12, 2019, made after a hearing, finding that the petitioner was ineligible to continue her occupancy of an apartment in a public housing development on the ground, inter alia, of nondesirability, and terminated her tenancy.

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.

The petitioner is a tenant of an apartment in a public housing development operated by the respondent, New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter NYCHA).  NYCHA sought to terminate the petitioner's tenancy, charging her with nondesirability, among other things, on the basis of aggressive and violent behavior towards NYCHA employees.  During an administrative hearing, in addition to otherwise defending against the charges, the petitioner proffered proof that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and requested that NYCHA provide her a reasonable accommodation for her disability.  The hearing officer sustained the charges against the petitioner, finding that her disability was insufficient to warrant a mitigated sanction and that “no reasonable accommodation ․ would offer a solution.”  The hearing officer recommended that the petitioner's tenancy be terminated.  NYCHA adopted the hearing officer's recommendation.  The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review NYCHA's determination, and the Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g).

As an initial matter, the petitioner is correct that NYCHA's references in its brief to a September 8, 2020 incident relate to facts outside of the record adduced before the hearing officer and, thus, are beyond the scope of judicial review in this administrative proceeding (see Matter of Rizzo v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 6 N.Y.3d 104, 110, 810 N.Y.S.2d 112, 843 N.E.2d 739;  Matter of Evans v. New York City, 94 A.D.3d 885, 887, 942 N.Y.S.2d 143).

Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing directed by law is generally limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see CPLR 7803[4];  Matter of Haug v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 32 N.Y.3d 1044, 1045, 87 N.Y.S.3d 146, 112 N.E.3d 323;  Matter of Burton v. New York City Hous. Auth., 177 A.D.3d 874, 874, 110 N.Y.S.3d 566;  Matter of Roper v. Municipal Hous. Auth. for City of Yonkers, 144 A.D.3d 925, 926, 41 N.Y.S.3d 117).  Here, NYCHA's determination to terminate the petitioner's tenancy was supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Stafford v. Hernanadez, 52 A.D.3d 304, 305, 859 N.Y.S.2d 643;  Matter of Zeigler v. New York City Hous. Auth., 35 A.D.3d 624, 624, 824 N.Y.S.2d 737;  see also Matter of Burton v. New York City Hous. Auth., 177 A.D.3d at 874, 110 N.Y.S.3d 566).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, under the circumstances presented, the hearing officer gave sufficient consideration to the petitioner's request for a reasonable accommodation (cf.  Matter of Washington v. Olatoye, 173 A.D.3d 467, 469, 103 N.Y.S.3d 388;  see generally 42 USC §§ 3602[h];  3604[f][3][B];  Matter of Prospect Union Assoc. v. DeJesus, 167 A.D.3d 540, 543, 91 N.Y.S.3d 36;  Handy v. City of New Rochelle, 198 F.Supp.3d 298, 308).

Moreover, in light of all the circumstances, the penalty of termination of the petitioner's tenancy was not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness (see Matter of Pell v. Bd. of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 233, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321;  Matter of Donmartin v. New York City Hous. Auth., 179 A.D.3d 678, 680, 113 N.Y.S.3d 576;  Matter of Burton v. New York City Hous. Auth., 177 A.D.3d at 875, 110 N.Y.S.3d 566).

The petitioner's remaining contention is without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., MILLER, WAN and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.