IN RE: Inbar ROTEM (2024)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 5–B, the father appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Orlando Marrazzo, Jr., J.), dated January 20, 2022.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the father's motion which was to vacate the registration of a foreign child support order.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The parties, who were never married, have one child together.  On July 18, 2019, a court in Israel issued an order of child support (hereinafter the foreign order) obligating the father to make monthly payments to the mother.  On March 13, 2020, the foreign order was registered in the Family Court, Richmond County, pursuant to article 5–B of the Family Court Act. Thereafter, the father moved to remove the matter from the Family Court to the Supreme Court and to vacate the registration of the foreign order.  In an order dated January 20, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of the father's motion which was to vacate the registration of the foreign order.  The father appeals.

New York adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (hereinafter UIFSA) as article 5–B of the Family Court Act (see Matter of Jasen v. Karassik, 101 A.D.3d 874, 876, 956 N.Y.S.2d 92;  Matter of Barros v. Vila, 271 A.D.2d 711, 713, 705 N.Y.S.2d 442).  Under the UIFSA, “[a] support order or income withholding order issued in another state or a foreign support order may be registered in this state for enforcement” (Family Ct Act § 580–601).  A foreign support order means “a support order of a foreign tribunal” (id. § 580–102[6]), which is “a court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial entity of a foreign country which is authorized to establish, enforce or modify support orders, or to determine parentage of a child” (id. § 580–102[7]).  A foreign country includes a country “which has been declared under the law of the United States to be a foreign reciprocating country” (id. § 580–102[5][i]), which includes Israel (see Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel for Cooperation in Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dept of Health & Human Servs, Off of Child Sup Servs [Feb. 5, 2009], available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/training-technical-assistance/israel-foreign-reciprocating-country [last accessed May 15, 2024]).

“A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered support order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of” eight enumerated defenses (Family Ct Act § 580–607[a];  see Matter of Harry v. Singh, 192 A.D.3d 1106, 1107, 141 N.Y.S.3d 361).  These defenses include that “there is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought ” (Family Ct Act § 580–607[a][5] [emphasis added]).  If the contesting party does not establish a defense, “the registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming the order” (id. § 580–607[c];  see Matter of Harry v. Singh, 192 A.D.3d at 1107, 141 N.Y.S.3d 361;  Matter of Barclay v. Hutchinson, 129 A.D.3d 953, 953, 10 N.Y.S.3d 450;  Matter of Barros v. Vila, 271 A.D.2d at 713, 705 N.Y.S.2d 442).

Here, the father failed to allege or establish any of the enumerated defenses pursuant to Family Court Act § 580–607(a).  To the extent that the father contends that his consent to the foreign order was based on a mistake, his remedy is to move to vacate or resettle the order in the courts of Israel (see Elsayed v. Edrees, 141 A.D.3d 503, 504, 35 N.Y.S.3d 411;  Matter of Strang v. Rathbone, 108 A.D.3d 565, 565–566, 968 N.Y.S.2d 572).  The father's contention that the foreign order should be vacated based on common-law principles of comity is without merit (see Matter of Alava v. Caceres, 195 A.D.3d 511, 511, 145 N.Y.S.3d 789;  Matter of Jasen v. Karassik, 101 A.D.3d at 877, 956 N.Y.S.2d 92;  Matter of Hiebaum v. Hiebaum, 233 A.D.2d 397, 398, 650 N.Y.S.2d 743).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the father's motion which was to vacate the registration of the foreign order.

The mother's contention that she is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130–1.1 is not properly before this Court.

DILLON, J.P., MALTESE, TAYLOR and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.