PEOPLE EX REL WELCH v. MAGINLEY LIDDIE (2024)

DECISION & JUDGMENT

Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application to release Christopher Ortiz upon his own recognizance or, in the alternative, to set reasonable bail upon Queens County Indictment No. 74782/2023.

ADJUDGED that the writ is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the petitioner's contentions, Christopher Ortiz was charged with qualifying offenses under CPL 510.10(4)(t).  He was charged with felony offenses that “arose from conduct occurring” while he was “released under conditions” of monetary bail on separate felony charges (id.).

The petitioner's contention that CPL 510.10(4)(t) does not apply in this case because Christopher Ortiz was released on bail and that statute applies to people “released on [their] own recognizance [or] released under conditions,” presents a question of pure statutory interpretation.  “[I]t is a bedrock principle of statutory interpretation that ‘the [c]ourt's primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature’ ” (Matter of Town of Southampton v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 39 N.Y.3d 201, 209, 184 N.Y.S.3d 706, 205 N.E.3d 426, quoting Matter of Mestecky v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.3d 239, 243, 66 N.Y.S.3d 207, 88 N.E.3d 365).  “ ‘Inasmuch as the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof’ ” (Matter of Town of Southampton v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 39 N.Y.3d at 209, 184 N.Y.S.3d 706, 205 N.E.3d 426, quoting Kuzmich v. 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC, 34 N.Y.3d 84, 91, 108 N.Y.S.3d 431, 132 N.E.3d 624).  “Furthermore, ‘[a] statute must be construed as a whole, and its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other’ ” (Matter of Town of Southampton v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 39 N.Y.3d at 209, 184 N.Y.S.3d 706, 205 N.E.3d 426, quoting Matter of Peyton v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, 36 N.Y.3d 271, 280, 140 N.Y.S.3d 447, 164 N.E.3d 253 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Town of Aurora v. Village of E. Aurora, 32 N.Y.3d 366, 372, 91 N.Y.S.3d 773, 116 N.E.3d 64).

Here, the petitioner, in contending that CPL 510.10(4)(t) is applicable only to principals released on their own recognizance or released under non-monetary conditions, seeks to read the term “non-monetary” into the statute, excluding bail as a condition.  However, CPL 510.10(4)(t) is the only statute within CPL article 510 to use the term “conditions” without the use of the modifier “non-monetary,” evidencing the intent of the Legislature to apply that statute to all conditions of release rather than only non-monetary conditions.  Further, CPL 500.10(10) defines “cash bail” as being posted “upon the condition that such money will become forfeit to the people of the state of New York if the principal does not comply with the directions of a court requiring his attendance at the criminal action or proceeding involved or does not otherwise render himself amenable to the orders and processes of the court” (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the charged crimes in this case were qualifying offenses under CPL 510.10(4)(t) (see People ex rel. Litman v. Spano, 197 A.D.3d 1211, 1212, 151 N.Y.S.3d 623).

In addition, the bail determination of the Supreme Court, Queens County, did not violate “constitutional or statutory standards” (People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger, 25 N.Y.2d 497, 499, 307 N.Y.S.2d 207, 255 N.E.2d 552;  see People ex rel. Rosenthal v. Wolfson, 48 N.Y.2d 230, 233, 422 N.Y.S.2d 55, 397 N.E.2d 745).

CONNOLLY, J.P., MALTESE, FORD and LOVE, JJ., concur.