JIMENEZ PANTALEON v. AUCANCELA (2023)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Richard Velasquez, J.), dated July 6, 2022.  The order denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability without prejudice to renew upon completion of party depositions.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.

In August 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in June 2021, when the vehicle that she was operating was struck in the rear by the defendants’ vehicle.  In an order dated July 6, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability with leave to renew upon completion of party depositions.  The plaintiff appeals.

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Thompson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 208 A.D.3d 815, 817, 175 N.Y.S.3d 66;  Perez v. Persad, 183 A.D.3d 771, 123 N.Y.S.3d 683).  “A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle” (Nsiah–Ababio v. Hunter, 78 A.D.3d 672, 672, 913 N.Y.S.2d 659;  see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a];  Balgobin v. McKenzie, 213 A.D.3d 893, 182 N.Y.S.3d 669).  “Stops by a lead vehicle which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows” (Perez v. Persad, 183 A.D.3d at 772, 123 N.Y.S.3d 683;  see Buchanan v. Keller, 169 A.D.3d 989, 991–992, 95 N.Y.S.3d 252).  “Moreover, an assertion that the lead vehicle came to a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle” (Perez v. Persad, 183 A.D.3d at 772, 123 N.Y.S.3d 683;  see McRae v. City of New York, 208 A.D.3d 775, 776, 174 N.Y.S.3d 418).  “A plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault to establish her or his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability” (Xin Fang Xia v. Saft, 177 A.D.3d 823, 825, 113 N.Y.S.3d 249;  see Rodriguez v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.3d 312, 76 N.Y.S.3d 898, 101 N.E.3d 366).

Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting her affidavit and an affidavit from a nonparty eyewitness, which demonstrated that the plaintiff's vehicle was stopped for a red traffic light when it was struck in the rear by the defendants’ vehicle (see McRae v. City of New York, 208 A.D.3d at 776, 174 N.Y.S.3d 418;  Perez v. Persad, 183 A.D.3d at 772, 123 N.Y.S.3d 683).  In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver had a nonnegligent explanation for coming into contact with the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle.  Additionally, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the motion was premature.  “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v. WS Distrib., Inc., 34 A.D.3d 759, 760, 825 N.Y.S.2d 516).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

DUFFY, J.P., GENOVESI, DOWLING and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.