PEOPLE v. JENNEMAN (2007)

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.), rendered July 23, 2004, convicting her of manslaughter in the second degree, leaving the scene of an incident without reporting, and failing to stay in a designated lane, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.   The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress her statements to the police.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

 The hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress her statements to the police.   The credibility determinations of a hearing court are entitled to great deference on appeal, and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v. Collier, 35 A.D.3d 628, 826 N.Y.S.2d 894;  People v. Johnson, 29 A.D.3d 603, 815 N.Y.S.2d 136;  People v. Tissiera, 22 A.D.3d 611, 801 N.Y.S.2d 747;  People v. Cunningham, 307 A.D.2d 366, 762 N.Y.S.2d 826).   The record supports the hearing court's decision to credit the testimony of the two police witnesses, which established that the defendant's right to counsel had not attached when she made inculpatory statements to them, and that her statements were voluntary (see People v. Daniels, 35 A.D.3d 756, 826 N.Y.S.2d 896;  People v. Johnson, supra;  People v. Cunningham, supra ).

Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of manslaughter in the second degree, and leaving the scene of an incident without reporting, beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Henrius, 6 A.D.3d 548, 774 N.Y.S.2d 400;  People v. Wolz, 300 A.D.2d 606, 752 N.Y.S.2d 382;  People v. Miller, 286 A.D.2d 981, 730 N.Y.S.2d 617;  People v. DeLong, 269 A.D.2d 824, 704 N.Y.S.2d 408;  People v. Patti, 229 A.D.2d 506, 646 N.Y.S.2d 133).   Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

 Furthermore, we reject the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence concerning her actions on the night of the victim's death.   The challenged evidence did not “concern the type of illegal or immoral conduct which would deprive the defendant of a fair trial” (People v. Gonsa, 220 A.D.2d 27, 30, 644 N.Y.S.2d 346;  see People v. Jones, 293 A.D.2d 489, 740 N.Y.S.2d 105;  People v. Reid, 259 A.D.2d 505, 686 N.Y.S.2d 766;  People v. Flores, 210 A.D.2d 1, 618 N.Y.S.2d 815).   In any event, even assuming that this evidence could be considered evidence of prior bad acts or uncharged crimes, it was properly admitted to complete the narrative of events surrounding the charged crimes (see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286;  People v. Jones, supra;  People v. Mateen, 227 A.D.2d 350, 642 N.Y.S.2d 899).