IN RE: George PERREGO (2009)

In a child support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Orange County (Bivona, J.), entered July 28, 2008, which denied his objections to an order of the same court (Braxton, S.M.), entered May 15, 2008, after a hearing, inter alia, in effect, denying his petition for a downward modification of his child support obligation.

ORDERED that the order entered July 28, 2008, is affirmed, with costs.

 Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(9)(b) provides that “[u]pon application by either party, the court may annul or modify any prior order or judgment as to maintenance or child support, upon a showing of the recipient's inability to be self-supporting or a substantial change in circumstance ․ including financial hardship.”  “The party seeking modification of a support order has the burden of establishing the existence of a substantial change in circumstances warranting the modification” (Matter of Nieves-Ford v. Gordon, 47 A.D.3d 936, 936, 850 N.Y.S.2d 588;  see Carr v. Carr, 187 A.D.2d 407, 408, 589 N.Y.S.2d 822).  “Importantly, in determining if there is a ‘substantial change in circumstances' to justify a downward modification, the change is measured by comparing the payor's financial circumstances at the time of the motion for downward modification and at the time of the divorce or the time when the order sought to be modified was made” (Matter of Sannuto v. Sannuto, 21 A.D.3d 901, 903, 800 N.Y.S.2d 601 [citation omitted];  see Klapper v. Klapper, 204 A.D.2d 518, 519, 611 N.Y.S.2d 657).

 The appellant did not meet his burden of establishing a substantial change in circumstances that would warrant a downward modification in his child support obligation.   Although the appellant claimed a loss of business since the time of the divorce, the Support Magistrate was entitled to discredit this testimony, especially since his reported income had increased.   “Where issues of credibility are presented, the determinations of a hearing court are accorded great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed if ․ warranted by the record” (Matter of Piernick v. Nazinitsky, 48 A.D.3d 690, 690, 850 N.Y.S.2d 914;  see Matter of Barrett v. Pickett, 5 A.D.3d 591, 592, 772 N.Y.S.2d 860;  Matter of Jackson v. Shuler, 292 A.D.2d 529, 530, 739 N.Y.S.2d 284;  Matter of Cattell v. Cattell, 254 A.D.2d 357, 357, 678 N.Y.S.2d 657).   Moreover, while the appellant claimed that the original child support obligation contained in the judgment of divorce was unfair considering his financial circumstances at that time, as the Support Magistrate correctly noted, the Family Court has no power to review a Supreme Court judgment determining the issue of child support or to determine the issue of child support de novo where the issue already has been determined by the Supreme Court and set forth in a judgment (see Family Ct. Act § 466;  Matter of Savini v. Burgaleta, 34 A.D.3d 686, 688-689, 825 N.Y.S.2d 493).

The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.