NEGRON v. JP MORGAN CHASE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK (2005)

In an action to recover damages for tortious interference with employment, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (O'Connell, J.), dated December 16, 2003, which granted the motion of the defendants JP Morgan Chase/Chase Manhattan Bank, Linda Padilla, and Vivette Henry to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) insofar as against them and the defendant Patricia Maffei.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

 The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the motion of the defendants JP Morgan Chase/Chase Manhattan Bank (hereinafter Chase), Linda Padilla, and Vivette Henry which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Chase pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7).   An employee who does not work under an agreement for a definite term of employment, is an at-will employee who may be discharged at any time with or without cause (see Robertazzi v. Cunningham, 294 A.D.2d 418, 742 N.Y.S.2d 115;  Thawley v. Turtell, 289 A.D.2d 169, 736 N.Y.S.2d 2;  Michnick v. Parkell Prods., 215 A.D.2d 462, 626 N.Y.S.2d 265) without the employer incurring any liability (see Tramondo v. Playboy Enters., 202 A.D.2d 1068, 609 N.Y.S.2d 124;   Blaise-Williams v. Sumitomo Bank, 189 A.D.2d 584, 592 N.Y.S.2d 41;   Porras v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 185 A.D.2d 784, 588 N.Y.S.2d 135;  Miano v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 184 A.D.2d 807, 584 N.Y.S.2d 234;  Baker v. Citibank, 178 A.D.2d 627, 577 N.Y.S.2d 875).   New York does not recognize a cause of action for the tort of abusive or wrongful discharge of an at-will employee (see Lobosco v. New York Tel. Co./NYNEX, 96 N.Y.2d 312, 727 N.Y.S.2d 383, 751 N.E.2d 462;  Priore v. New York Yankees, 307 A.D.2d 67, 761 N.Y.S.2d 608;  Howley v. Newsday, Inc., 215 A.D.2d 729, 627 N.Y.S.2d 85), and this rule cannot be circumvented by casting the cause of action in terms of tortious interference with employment (see Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 73 N.Y.2d 183, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771, 535 N.E.2d 1311).   Furthermore, the Supreme Court correctly granted that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the remaining defendants, since it consisted only of bare legal conclusions and factual allegations contradicted by the record (see Sesti v. North Bellmore Union Free School Dist., 304 A.D.2d 551, 756 N.Y.S.2d 902;  Palazzolo v. Herrick, Feinstein, LLP, 298 A.D.2d 372, 751 N.Y.S.2d 401).

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.