LOPEZ v. MINOT (1999)

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Murphy, J.), dated December 24, 1997, which granted the defendant's motion for leave to serve an amended answer and denied their cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motion for leave to serve an amended answer is denied, the plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for an inquest on damages.

 A rear-end collision into a stopped automobile creates a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle, imposing a duty of explanation on its operator (Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392, 638 N.Y.S.2d 110;  Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635, 635 N.Y.S.2d 694;  Gambino v. City of New York, 205 A.D.2d 583, 613 N.Y.S.2d 417;  Starace v. Inner Circle Qonexions, 198 A.D.2d 493, 604 N.Y.S.2d 179;  Edney v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 178 A.D.2d 398, 577 N.Y.S.2d 102;  Benyarko v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 162 A.D.2d 572, 573, 556 N.Y.S.2d 761).   The operator of the moving vehicle is required to rebut the inference of negligence created by an unexplained rear-end collision (see, Pfaffenbach v. White Plains Express Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 132, 135, 269 N.Y.S.2d 115, 216 N.E.2d 324), because he or she is in the best position to explain whether the collision was due to a reasonable, non-negligent cause (Carter v. Castle Elec. Contr. Co., 26 A.D.2d 83, 85, 271 N.Y.S.2d 51).   If the operator cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the plaintiffs may properly be awarded judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability (see, Starace v. Inner Circle Qonexions, supra, at 493, 604 N.Y.S.2d 179;  Young v. City of New York, 113 A.D.2d 833, 834, 493 N.Y.S.2d 585).

 Here, it is undisputed that the traffic was slowing down and speeding up, and that the defendant saw some “swerving” vehicles in front of the plaintiffs' van.   The plaintiff Luis Lopez managed to bring his van to a safe stop, but there is no explanation as to why the defendant could not do the same.   The defendant's deposition testimony, taken more than a year after the accident, that he could not “remember noticing” brake and other lights on the rear of the plaintiffs' van, does not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see, e.g., Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392, 638 N.Y.S.2d 110, supra;  Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635, 635 N.Y.S.2d 694, supra).   The defendant was under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his vehicle and the plaintiffs' vehicle (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] ), and his failure to do so in the absence of a reasonable, non-negligent explanation constituted negligence as a matter of law (see, Silberman v. Surrey Cadillac Limousine Serv., 109 A.D.2d 833, 486 N.Y.S.2d 357).   Since the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

The defendant's motion for leave to serve an amended answer is denied as academic.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.