IN RE: TRISTAN W. (Anonymous) (1999)

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Hepner, J.), entered December 22, 1997, which placed the appellant with the Office of Family and Children Services for a period of 18 months, upon (1) a fact-finding order of the same court, dated January 30, 1997, made upon his admission, finding that he had committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, (2) an order of disposition of the same court, also dated January 30, 1997, which, inter alia, conditionally discharged the appellant, (3) an order of disposition of the same court dated September 22, 1997, which vacated the order of disposition dated January 30, 1997, and granted the appellant a new conditional discharge, and (4) an order of the same court dated November 24, 1997, which, after a hearing, found that he had violated a condition of the second conditional discharge and vacated the order of disposition dated September 22, 1997.

ORDERED that the order of disposition entered December 22, 1997, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

 Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court's finding that he violated the terms of his second conditional discharge was supported by a preponderance of the evidence (see, Family Ct.Act § 360.3;  see also Matter of Julies R., 250 A.D.2d 855, 673 N.Y.S.2d 710;  Matter of Amanda RR, 230 A.D.2d 451, 659 N.Y.S.2d 912;  Matter of Alpheaus M., 168 A.D.2d 208, 562 N.Y.S.2d 93;  Matter of Gregory M., 131 Misc.2d 942, 502 N.Y.S.2d 570).

 The Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in placing the appellant with the Office of Family and Children Services for a period of 18 months.   The Family Court has wide discretion in entering dispositional orders (see, Family Ct.Act § 141;  Matter of Shariyf W., 245 A.D.2d 383, 665 N.Y.S.2d 588).   Moreover, it is well settled that “[t]he least restrictive alternative test does not require the court to actually try the lowest form of intervention, have it fail, and then try each succeeding level of intervention before ordering * * * placement” (Matter of Anthony M., 142 A.D.2d 731, 732, 531 N.Y.S.2d 116;  see, Matter of Lloyd L., 246 A.D.2d 651, 666 N.Y.S.2d 948;  Matter of Jason W., 207 A.D.2d 495, 615 N.Y.S.2d 918;  Matter of Jamil W., 184 A.D.2d 513, 584 N.Y.S.2d 194).   The Family Court's decision demonstrated that it carefully considered less restrictive alternatives to placement and balanced the needs of the appellant and the need for the protection of the community (see, Family Ct.Act § 352.2 [2] ).

The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.