IN RE: Esperanza WEIS (2006)

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6 for grandparent visitation, the mother and father appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Lynaugh, J.), entered September 12, 2005, as, after a hearing, granted the petition.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs or disbursements.

The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to appoint a Law Guardian to represent the child (see Richard D. v. Wendy P., 47 N.Y.2d 943, 944-945, 419 N.Y.S.2d 949, 393 N.E.2d 1022;  Matter of Walker v. Tallman, 256 A.D.2d 1021, 1022, 683 N.Y.S.2d 329;  Nacson v. Nacson, 166 A.D.2d 510, 511, 560 N.Y.S.2d 792;  cf. Matter of Acosta v. Acosta, 259 A.D.2d 747, 687 N.Y.S.2d 414;  Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 159 A.D.2d 113, 117, 558 N.Y.S.2d 596).

 The petitioners, the subject child's maternal grandmother and step-grandfather, commenced the instant proceeding seeking visitation with the grandchild, despite the objections of the child's parents.   Grandparents have standing to bring such proceedings where “either or both of the parents ․ is or are deceased” or where “conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene” (Domestic Relations Law § 72[1];  see Matter of Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178, 573 N.Y.S.2d 36, 577 N.E.2d 27).   Here, the grandmother established that she made a sufficient effort to establish a relationship with the child (see Matter of Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., supra ).   Accordingly, the grandmother established the requisite standing necessary for the Family Court to entertain the petition.

 The question of visitation, which involves a determination of what is in the child's best interests, is left to the discretion of the court (see Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522, 527, 387 N.Y.S.2d 412, 355 N.E.2d 372).   An essential part of this inquiry is whether a meaningful relationship exists between the petitioning grandparents and the child (see Matter of Ziarno v. Ziarno, 285 A.D.2d 793, 726 N.Y.S.2d 820;  Matter of Seymour S. v. Glen S., 189 A.D.2d 765, 592 N.Y.S.2d 410;  Matter of La Porte v. Rivers, 144 A.D.2d 861, 534 N.Y.S.2d 586).

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that visitation with the grandmother was in the best interests of the child (see Domestic Relations Law § 72).   The grandmother and step-grandfather established that they enjoyed a longstanding loving relationship with the subject child before the dispute that gave rise to this litigation.

Since animosity between the child's father and the petitioners is not a proper basis for the denial of visitation privileges to the grandmother, the Supreme Court properly granted the petition (see Kampf v. Worth, 108 A.D.2d 841, 842, 485 N.Y.S.2d 344;  Matter of Lachow v. Barasch, 57 A.D.2d 896, 394 N.Y.S.2d 284;  Matter of Vacula v. Blume, 53 A.D.2d 633, 384 N.Y.S.2d 208).