LOVE v. Zohar Zauber, et al., appellants. (2008)

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for injury to property, the defendants Zohar Zauber and David Ettedgui appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jacobson, J.), dated September 20, 2007, as denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and 3016(b) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

 “A party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must establish that ‘(1) the owners exercised complete domination of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked;  and (2) that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in the plaintiff's injury’ ” (Millennium Constr., LLC v. Loupolover, 44 A.D.3d 1016, 1016, 845 N.Y.S.2d 110, quoting Matter of Morris v. New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 82 N.Y.2d 135, 141, 603 N.Y.S.2d 807, 623 N.E.2d 1157;  see Hyland Meat Co. v. Tsagarakis, 202 A.D.2d 552, 552, 609 N.Y.S.2d 625).   The party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must further establish that the controlling corporation abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form to perpetrate a wrong or injustice against that party such that a court in equity will intervene (see Matter of Morris v. New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 82 N.Y.2d at 142, 603 N.Y.S.2d 807, 623 N.E.2d 1157;  Weinstein v. Willow Lake Corp., 262 A.D.2d 634, 635, 692 N.Y.S.2d 667;  Hyland Meat Co. v. Tsagarakis, 202 A.D.2d at 552, 609 N.Y.S.2d 625).   “The concept is equitable in nature, and the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil in a given instance will depend on the facts and circumstances” (Hyland Meat Co. v. Tsagarakis, 202 A.D.2d at 553, 609 N.Y.S.2d 625;  see Weinstein v. Willow Lake Corp., 262 A.D.2d at 635, 692 N.Y.S.2d 667).

 Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting as true all facts alleged therein, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511;  Breytman v. Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 A.D.3d 703, 864 N.Y.S.2d 70;  Asgahar v. Tringali Realty, Inc., 18 A.D.3d 408, 795 N.Y.S.2d 68), the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a cause of action to recover against the appellants for the alleged wrongs committed by the corporate defendants pursuant to a “ ‘[p]iercing [of] the corporate veil’ ” theory (Ventresca Realty Corp. v. Houlihan, 28 A.D.3d 537, 538, 813 N.Y.S.2d 196, quoting Weinstein v. Willow Lake Corp., 262 A.D.2d at 635, 692 N.Y.S.2d 667).   Contrary to the appellants' contention, the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that they exercised complete domination and control over the assetless corporation in order to commit a wrong against the plaintiff (see Ventresca Realty Corp. v. Houlihan, 28 A.D.3d 537, 813 N.Y.S.2d 196).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.