IN RE: The CITY OF NEW YORK (2026)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Naita A. Semaj, J.), entered on or about July 23, 2025, awarding petitioner The City of New York $476,056.44 as against respondent VYS 1535 LLC, and bringing up for review an order, same court and Justice, entered on or about March 10, 2025, which granted the City's motion for summary judgment on its motion to declare the validity of a relocation lien, unanimously modified, on the law, to vacate the personal money judgment against VYS and to direct foreclosure and sale of the land and the building thereon known as 1535 Vyse Avenue Block 2989, lot 45, County of Bronx, State of New York, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

In August 2014, the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) issued a vacate order for 1535 Vyse Avenue in the Bronx, a building owned by respondent Arbah Bonim, LLC, finding the entire building unsafe to occupy.  The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) later issued a separate vacate order for the same address.  As a result of the orders, HPD provided relocation services for seven individuals who lived in the premises.  VYS later bought the premises “as is” with all violations and penalties.  In December 2019, HPD filed a relocation lien for $335,795.23 against 1535 Vyse Avenue.  The City later commenced this proceeding against VYS seeking to enforce the lien.

As the City notes, two of VYS's arguments on appeal were not previously raised:  1) that the City failed to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment;  and 2) that the Administrative Code of the City of N.Y. former § 26–305 does not authorize a personal money judgment against it.  While an argument not raised before the motion court generally cannot be asserted on appeal, “where ‘a party does not allege new facts but, rather, raises a legal argument which appeared upon the face of the record and which could not have been avoided ․ if brought to [his or her] attention at the proper juncture,’ such argument may be raised for the first time on appeal” (Watson v. City of New York, 157 AD3d 510, 511 [1st Dept 2018] [internal citation omitted] ).  Here, VYS's arguments are legal, appear on the face of the record, and could not have been avoided had they been raised at the proper time.  Accordingly, we consider the arguments (see id.;  Vanship Holdings Ltd. v Energy Infrastructure Acquisition Corp., 65 AD3d 405, 408 [1st Dept 2009] ).

VYS's argument that the City failed to establish the reasonableness of the amount it spent on relocating tenants is unavailing.  The City met its prima facie burden on summary judgment by submitting the relocation lien as proof of expenses.  In opposition, VYS, the property owner, failed to address the reasonableness of the City's expenses (see Rivera v Department of Hous. Preserv.   & Dev. of the City of N.Y., 29 NY3d 45, 55 [2017] ).

Further, VYS asserts that Arbah Bonim, not VYS, owned the building when the vacate orders leading to the relocations were issued, and therefore, Supreme Court should not have imposed personal liability against VYS. Contrary to VYS's contention, however, reversal is not required on that basis and we instead modify the relief granted by the Supreme Court to direct foreclosure and sale of the property to satisfy the lien (see Administrative Code of the City of N.Y. former § 26–305[4] ).  Indeed, the City has stated that it does not oppose this modification in lieu of taking personal judgment against VYS.

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach VYS's remaining arguments.