BRIGHAM v. ARNOLD (2026)

Thomas C. Brigham, appellant pro se.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New York (Steven Montgomery of counsel), for respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Mary V. Rosado, J.), entered June 12, 2025, which granted the motion of defendants Sara Arnold and Oaklander, Coogan & Vitto, PC to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) and (7), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Supreme Court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's causes of action for defamation because they were barred by the one-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 215[3] ).  The alleged defamatory statements were made in 2019 and plaintiff commenced this action in 2024, well outside the one-year limitations period.  That plaintiff did not discover the alleged defamation until 2023 is not relevant because the limitations period begins to run upon publication (see Biaggi v. O'Flynn, 216 AD3d 484, 484–485 [1st Dept 2023];  see also Firth v. State of New York, 98 N.Y.2d 365, 369 [2002];  Dashdevs LLC v Capital Mkts. Placement, Inc., 210 AD3d 525, 526 [1st Dept 2022] ).

The statute of limitations was not tolled due to equitable estoppel, as plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he reasonably relied on defendants' alleged deceptions and misrepresentations which in turn induced him to refrain from filing a timely action (see Zumpano v. Quinn, 6 NY3d 666, 674 [2006] ).  This is so given plaintiff's separate ongoing litigation against these defendants and others, commenced in 2015, alleging fraud and misrepresentations (see Brigham v. Jaffe, Sup Ct, N.Y. County, index No.

). Thus, any claim that plaintiff relied on defendants' subsequent representations was not reasonable.  Defendants also had no duty to disclose the purportedly offending documents.  The 2015 action, which would have otherwise been in discovery, had been dismissed at the time that the statements were made and was not reinstated by this Court until well over a year later (see Brigham v. Jaffe, 189 AD3d 475 [1st Dept 2020] ).  Further, even upon reinstatement, plaintiff served no discovery demands in that action until 2024.

Supreme Court also correctly dismissed the causes of action sounding in architectural malpractice because plaintiff lacked the necessary privity with defendants (see 905 5th Assoc., Inc. v. Weintraub, 85 AD3d 667, 668 [1st Dept 2011];  Tycon Tower I Inv. Ltd. Partnership v Burgee Architects, 234 A.D.2d 748, 749 [3d Dept 1996], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 804 [1997] ).  Defendants were hired by the nonparty building owner to provide architectural services to them.  Plaintiff further failed to establish that he was in a relationship with defendants that could be viewed as the functional equivalent of privity given the adversarial relationship occasioned by the 2015 action against defendants and others based on largely the same or similar underlying facts and actions (see generally Sykes v RFD Third Ave. 1 Assoc., LLC, 15 NY3d 370, 373 [2010] ).  Furthermore, there is no indication that plaintiff could have relied, or that defendants could have expected plaintiff would have relied, on representations made between defendants and the nonparties as creating a quasi-professional relationship between them given the adversarial nature of their relationship.

For a similar reason, plaintiff's fraud-based claims were properly dismissed.  Plaintiff has not pleaded, nor could he have, that he justifiably relied on subsequent statements made by defendants, a necessary element in any fraud claim, in light of the related 2015 action in which plaintiff accused defendants and others of misrepresentations and fraud (see Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 NY3d 553, 559 [2009];  SL 4000 Conn. LC v. CBRE, Inc., 219 AD3d 417, 418–419 [1st Dept 2023] ).

We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.