AHMED v. CHOUDHRY (2026)

Thompson & Skrabanek, PLLC, New York (J.R. Skrabanek of counsel), for appellant.

Kapoor & Coyle Law Firm, Syracuse (Andrew T. Coyle of counsel), for respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lyle E. Frank, J.), entered May 21, 2025, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

This action arises from a family dispute between plaintiff, on the one hand, and his sister, defendant Nazia Ahmed, and their mother, defendant Shahla Choudhry, on the other.  It concerns certain real property located in Pennsylvania and Long Island, and the disposition of the assets of Mahmood Choudhry, their father and husband, respectively, who died in Saudi Arabia in December 2009.  According to plaintiff, defendants repeatedly assured him that title to the Pennsylvania property would be transferred to him and that he reasonably relied on those representations.  Also according to plaintiff, he purchased a Long Island property based on defendants' allegedly false representations that they had no money and that Shahla needed a place to live.

The court properly dismissed the complaint in its entirety based on the statute of limitations, plaintiff's failure to oppose dismissal of the third and sixth through tenth causes of action, and the failure to state those claims.

Plaintiff does not dispute that the six-year statute of limitations applied to the first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action sounding in breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit, but asserts that the defenses of equitable estoppel and fraudulent concealment resurrected these claims.  However, plaintiff did not assert equitable estoppel as a defense in opposition to defendants' motion before Supreme Court, and thus, his argument is unpreserved.

In any event, plaintiff failed to make the requisite showing for equitable estoppel to apply (see Putter v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 7 NY3d 548, 552–553 [2006] ).  He did not demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in bringing the action (see id. at 553;  Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 449–450 [1978] ).  According to allegations in the complaint, Mahmood's assets were distributed in 2009 or 2010, defendants did not transfer title to the Pennsylvania property in December 2016, despite their alleged promise to do so, and defendants coerced plaintiff into purchasing the Long Island property, also in 2016.  Plaintiff further alleges that he became aware of defendants' concealed assets in January 2019, and that in November 2020, Shahla failed to make the promised rental payments on the Long Island property.  Text messages from October 2022 show that plaintiff was aware of potential claims and was consulting a lawyer at that time, yet he waited another year and four months after the exchange of these text messages to commence this action.  Additionally, plaintiff stated in his affidavit that defendants repudiated the alleged agreement in 2021, but he did not file the action until 2024.  All this, taken together, demonstrates a lack of due diligence.

Plaintiff also failed to demonstrate that his reliance on defendants' representations for over eight years was reasonable given their repeated failure to live up to their alleged agreement to transfer title to the Pennsylvania property to plaintiff (see Putter, 7 NY3d at 553;  Simcuski, 44 N.Y.2d at 449–450).  Additionally, the same misrepresentations and acts of concealment form the basis of plaintiff's underlying substantive causes of action, which also precludes the application of equitable estoppel to resurrect the claims (see Knobel v. Shaw, 90 AD3d 493, 494–495 [1st Dept 2011] ).

The court did not improperly resolve disputed issues of fact, draw inferences against plaintiff, or convert defendants' motion for dismissal into a motion for summary judgment.  Rather, the court's determination was based on the allegations of the complaint and the statements in plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to defendants' motion, which were properly accepted as true.  Moreover, discovery cannot save the claims because the court accepted as true plaintiff's own chronology.

Plaintiff asserts that the court mistakenly found that he did not oppose dismissal of the causes of action for conversion, civil embezzlement, fraud, misrepresentation, misappropriation of funds, and attorneys' fees – the third and sixth through tenth causes of action, respectively.  However, a review of plaintiff's opposition to defendants' motion reveals that he did not directly address dismissal of these causes of action, as the court properly found.

In any event, the cause of action for conversion has a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[3] ), and was, therefore, properly dismissed as time barred.  The cause of action for civil embezzlement is not a recognized legal claim in New York (see Crandall v. Bernard, Overton & Russell, 133 A.D.2d 878, 879 [3d Dept 1987], appeal dismissed 70 N.Y.2d 940 [1988] ).  Moreover, the claim for civil embezzlement may be characterized as conversion, which is time-barred for the reasons noted above.

The seventh and eighth causes of action are based on fraud and the time within which to commence the action was the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from discovery (CPLR 213[8] ).  As already noted, plaintiff alleged that he was coerced into purchasing the Long Island property in 2016 due to defendants' false representations that they had no money and that Shahla needed a place to live.  He also contends that he learned in January 2019 that these assertions were false, yet this action was not commenced until eight years after the alleged false misrepresentations and five years after their discovery.  Thus, the seventh and eighth causes of action were also untimely.  Moreover, these claims, as well as the third cause of action for conversion, are duplicative of the breach of contract claims and subject to dismissal on this ground as well (see MBW Adv. Network v. Century Bus. Credit Corp., 173 A.D.2d 306, 306 [1st Dept 1991] ).

The cause of action for misappropriation of funds is subject to a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[3] ).  Plaintiff alleged that the misappropriated assets were part of Mahmood's estate and were distributed in 2009 or 2010.  Thus, this claim is time barred as well.

The cause of action for attorneys' fees was properly dismissed because this claim is not recognized in New York as a separate cause of action.  Rather, they are recoverable only as an element of contract damages (see Pier 59 Studios L.P. v. Chelsea Piers L.P., 27 AD3d 217, 217 [1st Dept 2006] ).

Finally, plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was properly dismissed as the conduct referenced in the complaint was insufficient to support the claim as it was not directed at the public generally (see id. at 217).

Plaintiff requests leave to amend the complaint.  However, amendment would be futile since plaintiff cannot cure the defects (see MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Greystone & Co., Inc., 74 AD3d 499, 500 [1st Dept 2010] ).

We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.