JRT REALTY GROUP INC v. CUSHMAN WAKEFIELD INC (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Anar R. Patel, J.), entered June 23, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety with respect to all defendants, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Supreme Court correctly concluded that plaintiff's defamation claim falls within the scope of New York's amended anti-SLAPP statute (Civil Rights Law §§ 70–a, 76–a).  The challenged April 2024 email constituted conduct in furtherance of protected speech “in connection with an issue of public interest” under § 76–a(1)(a)(2).  Although the allegedly defamatory communication was initially sent internally to government officials, it addressed issues relating to a subcontractor's performance on a City contract that are not “purely private matters” but fall squarely within the broad definition of public interest under the statute.  And an email sent to a government agency concerning such matters is not directed to a limited, private audience.

The court also properly rejected plaintiff's argument that the email was “unlawful conduct” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, which contemplates acts such as fraud, threats, or harassment that are not alleged here.

Once defendants established that the claim was subject to anti-SLAPP, plaintiff was required to show a “substantial basis in law” for its defamation claim (CPLR 3211[g][1] ).  Although this requirement does not impose a “clear and convincing evidence” burden at the pleading stage (Reeves v Foundation for the Child Victims of the Family Cts., 246 AD3d 542, 543 [1st Dept 2026] ), it “requires such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate,” which is more exacting than the ordinary CPLR 3211(a)(7) standard (Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 232 AD3d 10, 20–25 [1st Dept 2024], lv dismissed 44 NY3d 990 [2025] ).  The court correctly found that plaintiff failed to meet this burden.

While that burden may be satisfied by an amended complaint verified by a person with personal knowledge of the facts, which may be used as an affidavit (see Mancilla & Fantone, LLP v. Liu, 242 AD3d 606, 607 [1st Dept 2025] ), the substantial-basis standard is not met here.  The allegations in the complaint rest almost entirely on meanings that can be inferred from defendants' statements regarding how plaintiff's account would be handled going forward and asserting performance issues, rather than concrete false statements.  Thus, plaintiff needed to submit supporting evidence in addition to the verified allegations in order to satisfy the heightened substantial-basis standard.

The court also properly dismissed the claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations.  To the extent the claim relied on statements in the April email, it was subject to — and defeated by — the same anti-SLAPP analysis.  The additional alleged acts, including defendants' decisions to cease assigning plaintiff new work and disputes regarding information access, are all related to defendants' decision to stop assigning plaintiff new work, which, at most, may have been a contractual breach, but not a wrongful act that can constitute tortious interference.

The claim seeking declaratory relief regarding future commissions was correctly dismissed as unripe.  Any commission dispute may be litigated if and when a specific underpayment occurs, which avoids the court rendering an advisory opinion on hypothetical future obligations (see Touro Coll. v. Novus Univ. Corp., 146 AD3d 679, 679–680 [1st Dept 2017] ).

The court properly dismissed plaintiff's breach-of-contract claims for lack of standing.  Although the Professional Services Contract (PSC) with the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) references plaintiff as the designated M/WBE subcontractor, the contractual provisions governing staffing, subcontractor changes, and compliance obligations constitute promises running exclusively to DCAS, a public agency with sole enforcement authority.  Nothing in the contract provides plaintiff with independent remedial rights or establishes that it is an intended third-party beneficiary within the meaning of New York law.  Even assuming standing, plaintiff's allegations regarding purported breaches of Sections 2(F)(1), 2(F)(4), 2(F)(5), and 4(B) are either conclusory or reliant on contractual obligations owed solely to DCAS.

Because plaintiff lacks standing to enforce the PSC and no contract between plaintiff and defendants governs the conduct at issue, the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was correctly dismissed.

The unfair competition claim was also properly dismissed.  Plaintiff alleges that defendants misappropriated its “know-how” and methods, but unlike in Valkyrie AI LLC v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (233 AD3d 460 [1st Dept 2024] ), the allegations in the complaint here do not identify anything that could constitute protectable proprietary information or trade secrets belonging to it, and the complaint is not bolstered by affidavit evidence indicating the novelty and secrecy of plaintiff's methods.

Finally, the motion court properly treated defendants' motion to dismiss as made on behalf of all defendants.  Plaintiff's briefing addressed all defendants collectively, and plaintiff identifies no prejudice arising from the court's determination.