207 209 LLC v. Orlando De La Cruz, Respondent-Respondent, and John Doe and Jane Doe, Respondents (2026)

Per Curiam.

Order (Yekaterina Blinova, J.), dated June 18, 2026, affirmed, with $10 costs.

Having prevailed on their succession defense in this holdover proceeding, Civil Court properly awarded attorneys' fees to respondents. The ninth and sixteenth paragraphs of the governing lease agreement were sufficiently broad to trigger a reciprocal right to attorneys' fees in respondents' favor pursuant to Real Property Law (RPL) § 234 (see Graham Ct. Owner's Corp. v Taylor, 115 AD3d 50 [2014], affd 24 NY3d 742 [2015]; 65 W.E. Assoc. v Gari, 42 Misc 3d 129[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52182[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2013]; see also 245 Realty Assoc. v Sussis, 243 AD2d 29 [1998]).

Contrary to petitioner's contention, respondents' reciprocal right to attorneys' fees pursuant to RPL § 234 is not barred by the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA)'s amendment of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 702 (1). This provision, as amended, defines "rent" as "the monthly or weekly amount charged in consideration for the use and occupation of a dwelling pursuant to a written or oral rental agreement" and further provides that "[n]o fees, charges or penalties other than rent may be sought in a summary proceeding pursuant to this article, notwithstanding any language to the contrary in any lease or rental agreement." We disagree with petitioner's contention that this amendment bars respondents' counterclaim for attorneys' fees.

The operative words in RPAPL § 702, i.e., "[n]o fees, charges or penalties other than rent may be sought in a summary proceeding" may be capable of a wider significance if found alone. However, the principal of ejusdem generis, "requires the court to limit general language of a statute by specific phrases which have preceded the general language" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 239; see Matter of Avella v City of New York, 131 AD3d 77, 85 [2015], affd 29 NY3d 425 [2017]). Thus, the quoted words are limited in their effect by the words to which they are adjunct, namely the preceding sentence that redefines "rent" for purposes of a summary proceeding. Properly construed, RPAPL § 702 (1) is a limitation on what can be recovered as "rent" in a summary proceeding. This provision does not preclude a tenant from counterclaiming for attorneys' fees.

In this regard, the statutory right of a prevailing tenant to "counterclaim in any ... summary proceeding" for attorneys' fees pursuant to RPL § 234 has been in existence for more than half a century (see RPL § 234, L.1966, c. 286, § 1. Amended L.1969, c. 297), and such counterclaims are ubiquitous in Housing Court. Manifestly, if the legislature intended so consequential a change as to deny tenants of this statutory right, such intent would have been expressed in plain words and not left to implication (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 391, p 558; see 417 E 9th Partners LLC v Agresti, 87 Misc 3d 1245[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51906[U] [NY Civ Ct 2025]). Stated differently, the absence of an express provision in HSTPA amending or repealing RPL § 234's express allowance of a counterclaim for attorneys' fees gives rise to a presumption that repeal was not intended (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 391; see Cimo v State of New York, 306 NY 143, 148-149 [1953]). Indeed, HSTPA only amended RPL § 234 (1) to the limited extent of barring landlords from recovering attorneys' fees on a default judgment. Critically, HSTPA did not eliminate RPL § 234 (1)'s allowance of attorneys' fees to tenants by way of a counterclaim in a summary proceeding, nor did it amend RPAPL § 743, which authorizes a respondent to interpose an answer which may include any legal defense or counterclaim, or CCA 208, which grants Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain monetary counterclaims in a summary proceeding. Thus, "it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend to overturn long established rules of law" which enabled tenants to counterclaim for legal fees in a summary proceeding (see Rockaway One Co., LLC v Wiggins, 35 AD3d 36, 39 [2006]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

I concur I concur I concur

Decision Date: October 27, 2026