WEISS v. SALGADO (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Kathy J. King, J.), entered on or about May 28, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied the motion of defendants Nathaniel Berman, Jun Lee, Robert Sean Tanouye, and New York Presbyterian Hospital/Weill Cornell Medical Center (WCMC) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the complaint dismissed as to all parties, including Phong Anh Hunyh.  The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendants sustained their prima facie burden of showing entitlement to summary judgment by submitting affidavits of defendants Suresh Gerardine and Tarke Barbar, and Dr. Ross Littauer, M.D.;  the deposition transcripts of defendants Jessica Salgado and Catherine Puangco;  and the expert affirmations of Dr. Lee C. Ruotsi, Dr. Robert A. Press, and Sara Newman, RN. This evidence established that defendants' treatment of plaintiff's decedent met the standard of good and accepted medical practice and that nothing in their treatment was the proximate cause of his injuries or death.  The burden therefore shifted to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986] ).

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  The opinions of plaintiff's experts were in places unsupported or contradicted by the record (see id.;  Richardson v Ky, 236 AD3d 609, 610 [1st Dept 2025];  Coronel v New York City Health & Hosps.  Corp., 47 AD3d 456, 457 [1st Dept 2008] ).  Plaintiff's expert vascular surgeon opined that the medication infusions given to the decedent, who suffered from renal disease, should have been performed through his preexisting dialysis central line (also known as a permacath) because his condition called for emergency treatment.  However, a peripheral intravenous line (PIV) was placed within seconds and was available for immediate use.  Plaintiff's vascular surgeon opined that the permacath was preferable, as it eliminated the risk of extravasation.  However, neither party disputed that use of dialysis ports are disfavored, as clots can render them unusable.  Further, plaintiff's expert surgeon failed to address the fact that the renal care team needed to use the permacath for dialysis as soon as the infusions were finished and that using it for the infusions put that vital care at risk.

In addition, the opinion of plaintiff's expert nurse that it was error for a nurse to take decedent's blood pressure on the same arm as the PIV was based on the assertion that pressure from a blood pressure cuff could cause medications that were being infused to extravasate into the surrounding tissues.  However, the records confirm that infusions were not performed while the decedent's blood pressure was being taken (see Cabrera v Golden, 231 AD3d 149, 155 [1st Dept 2024] ).  In addition, the assertions that the decedent's blood pressure should have been taken at his lower extremities did not account for the fact that one leg had been partially amputated and the other was ulcerated with osteomyelitis.

The records also contradict plaintiff's assertion that the decedent's PIV site was not regularly inspected.  Indeed, the record shows that a physician examined the decedent's extremities approximately one hour before evidence of extravasation emerged (see Browder v New York City Health & Hosps.  Corp., 37 AD3d 375, 375 [1st Dept 2007];  Wong v Goldbaum, 23 AD3d 277, 279–280 [1st Dept 2005] ).  Although plaintiff's expert surgeon avers that the PIV site could have been aspirated and chelating agents used, the expert fails to address the assertion of defendants' expert that since the last infusion had occurred over 24 hours before, treatments beyond a compress and elevation were no longer available (see Pietroforte v Belle Harbor Home of the Sages, Inc., 220 AD3d 628, 628–629 [1st Dept 2023];  Homan v David Seinfeld, M.D., PLLC, 164 AD3d 1147, 1148 [1st Dept 2018] ).

In view of the foregoing, we need not reach defendants' arguments concerning immunity under Public Health Law § 3080 (Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act).