PEOPLE v. LETANG (2026)

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Albert Lorenzo, J., on omnibus motion;  Miriam R. Best, J., at trial and sentencing), rendered June 24, 2019, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth and seventh degrees, and sentencing him to three years of probation and a conditional discharge, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007];  see also People v. Baque, 43 N.Y.3d 26, 229 N.Y.S.3d 62, 254 N.E.3d 606 [2024] ).

The trial court providently exercised its discretion in admitting the narcotics evidence.  While there were gaps in the chain of custody, the People “provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the narcotics evidence” (People v. Julian, 41 N.Y.2d 340, 342–343, 392 N.Y.S.2d 610, 360 N.E.2d 1310 [1977] ).  Because “logical explanations for the inconsistencies [were] provided, or can reasonably be inferred from the surrounding circumstances,” any gaps “merely raise[d] weight and credibility issues for the jury to resolve” (People v. Baez, 42 N.Y.3d 124, 130, 217 N.Y.S.3d 496, 241 N.E.3d 1257 [2024] ).

The trial court also providently precluded evidence of a person whose description did not match defendant completing sales of cocaine in the apartment prior to the search warrant's execution.  Evidence of these prior sales by another person has “little or no probative value” regarding the defendant's constructive possession of the cocaine found in the apartment on the night of the sale (People v. Shepard, 80 A.D.3d 421, 422, 914 N.Y.S.2d 135 [1st Dept. 2011], lv denied 16 N.Y.3d 899, 926 N.Y.S.2d 35, 949 N.E.2d 983 [2011] ).  Conversely, the ability for other persons to access the apartment was relevant to the question of constructive possession (People v. DeJesus, 44 A.D.3d 464, 468, 843 N.Y.S.2d 294 [1st Dept. 2007], lv denied 10 N.Y.3d 763, 854 N.Y.S.2d 325, 883 N.E.2d 1260 [2008] ), and defendant presented such evidence to the jury for consideration.

Regardless of whether defendant's motion to reopen his motion for a Mapp hearing was timely, the court properly denied the motion.  Defendant's motion for a Mapp hearing was supported by only conclusory allegations (see People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415, 426, 604 N.Y.S.2d 922, 624 N.E.2d 1017 [1993] ).  Additionally, the police handcuffed defendant upon entering the apartment to execute a search warrant, which did not constitute an arrest, and defendant was searched only after the police had acquired probable cause “based on their reasonable belief, given the totality of the circumstances, that defendant had committed a narcotics-related crime” (People v. Henderson, 162 A.D.3d 517, 517, 79 N.Y.S.3d 131 [1st Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1111, 91 N.Y.S.3d 363, 115 N.E.3d 635 [2018] ).