PEOPLE v. MERCADO (2026)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Caro, J.), rendered July 10, 2024, as amended July 12, 2024, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 16 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

Supreme Court properly denied suppression of defendant's March 6, 2021 statement to police regarding the charged homicide.  Following the administration of his Miranda rights, the interrogating detective asked defendant whether he was “willing to talk about what happened today.”  Defendant contends that his waiver of his rights was “limited in scope” to what happened that day, which defendant asserts was “an arrest for a bench warrant on a farebeat case [that] did not cover the alleged homicide.”  This argument is without merit.  As a general rule, there is no “limited” Miranda waiver.  The Miranda warnings advise individuals of their right to refuse to answer questions or give information to law enforcement, and to protect themselves from self-incrimination.  “A suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege” (Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 [1987];  see also People v. Garcia, 284 A.D.2d 106, 107, 726 N.Y.S.2d 27 [1st Dept. 2001], lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 641, 735 N.Y.S.2d 497, 761 N.E.2d 2 [2001] [police tactics did not render the defendant's confession involuntary and beyond advising the defendant of his constitutional rights, the police were under no obligation to inform him of the specific crime they were investigating] ).

In any event, the record does not support defendant's claim that he believed that he was waiving his rights only as to the case involving the fare beating warrant.  Indeed, in defendant's first videotaped confession, on March 6, 2021, defendant assented to waiving his rights by answering “Yeah.” Further, “what happened today” could have referred to the events in the homicide case that day—which included discovery of the body and interview of a witness and a suspect.  As Supreme Court properly found that defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, we need not consider defendant's argument that his second confession, on March 7, was tainted by a prior inadmissible confession.

We reject defendant's claim that his due process rights were violated by the court's curtailment of questioning regarding the intent and mindset of the officers as bearing on alleged deception and bad faith on their part.  Supreme Court ultimately allowed defense counsel to ask several such questions.  Nothing in the officers' answers, or in the record as a whole, supported defendant's claim that the officers engaged in improper trickery and manipulation that undermined defendant's right to counsel.  Contrary to defendant's argument, the officers had no need to avoid the question of whether defendant was represented on the other case because when a defendant's “right to counsel ha[s] attached on unrelated ․ charges,” a defendant may be “lawfully questioned on the present charges when he [is] returned on a bench warrant” (People v. Brevard, 149 A.D.3d 546, 546, 51 N.Y.S.3d 514 [1st Dept. 2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 947, 67 N.Y.S.3d 131, 89 N.E.3d 521 [2017];  People v. Clarke, 298 A.D.2d 259, 259, 748 N.Y.S.2d 376 [1st Dept. 2002], lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 613, 757 N.Y.S.2d 823, 787 N.E.2d 1169 [2003] ).