IN RE: Emanuel TROISE et al. (2026)

Judgment (denominated an order), Supreme Court, New York County (Lyle E. Frank, J.), entered on or about October 20, 2025, denying the petition to annul a determination of the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH), dated July 3, 2025, which declined to process petitioners' document request in the particular manner in which it was made, and granting OATH's cross-motion to dismiss the petition brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Mandamus to compel may only be used “to enforce a clear legal right where the public official has failed to perform a duty enjoined by law” (New York Civ. Liberties Union v. State of New York, 4 N.Y.3d 175, 184, 791 N.Y.S.2d 507, 824 N.E.2d 947 [2005];  CPLR 7803[1] ).  Mandamus is appropriate to compel public officers to perform ministerial duties but not discretionary acts (see Matter of Gomez v. New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 247 A.D.3d 677, 678, 253 N.Y.S.3d 614 [1st Dept. 2026] ).  “A discretionary act involves the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result” (New York Civ. Liberties Union, 4 N.Y.3d at 184, 791 N.Y.S.2d 507, 824 N.E.2d 947 [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted] ).

Petitioner did not establish a clear legal right to have OATH process document requests sent to the clerk's general email address, just because it had processed requests sent to that address in the past (see Matter of New York City Yacht Club v. New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 172 A.D.3d 606, 606–07, 102 N.Y.S.3d 19 [1st Dept. 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 914, 2019 WL 4383835 [2019];  Matter of DiBlasio v. Novello, 28 A.D.3d 339, 344, 814 N.Y.S.2d 51 [1st Dept. 2006] ).  The way a government entity requires submission of an information request is discretionary, especially when it is only redirecting the request from one email account to another and requiring proof of the petitioner's entitlement to seek the information requested.  Accordingly, OATH was entitled to require that petitioners or their counsel send any requests related to New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) records to a dedicated email and provide a valid DOB license (see generally Matter of Widerman v. New York City Hous. Auth., 128 A.D.3d 599, 600, 10 N.Y.S.3d 70 [1st Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 912, 2015 WL 7387125 [2015] ).

OATH's redirection of petitioners' document request was not arbitrary and capricious (see CPLR 7803[3] ).  If a court “conclude[s] that the determination is supported by a rational basis, [it] must sustain the [agency's] determination even if [it] concludes that it would have reached a different result than the one reached by the agency” (Matter of Wooley v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 15 N.Y.3d 275, 280, 907 N.Y.S.2d 741, 934 N.E.2d 310 [2010] [internal quotation mark omitted] ).  Government agencies frequently adjust their internal processes for purposes of convenience or efficiency, and OATH's redirection of document requests to a new email address and its added requirement that the requestor provide a valid DOB license constituted a reasonable and uncomplicated processing change.

We have considered petitioner's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.