IN RE: The PEOPLE of the State of New York EX. REL. James W. MAGEE (2026)

Judgment (denominated an order), Supreme Court, New York County (Ellen N. Biben, J.), entered on or about January 12, 2026, which denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the proceeding, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Supreme Court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the motion court's (Beth Beller, J.) denial of petitioner's motion for release.  The period from August 27, 2025 to October 24, 2025 was correctly deemed excludable as a reasonable period for pretrial motion practice pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(a) and CPL 255.20.

On August 27, 2025, petitioner was charged in a felony complaint with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (Penal Law § 220.21[1] ) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16[1] ).  The complaint alleged that petitioner was arrested after a vehicle stop revealed that petitioner was seated in the front passenger seat with a backpack containing drugs near his feet.  Petitioner was arraigned on the felony complaint in Criminal Court on August 27, 2025, and on August 29, 2025, a grand jury indicted petitioner, charging him with the drug possession crimes pursuant to indictment No. 73984–2025.

On September 5, 2025, petitioner was arraigned on the indictment in Supreme Court and pleaded not guilty.  The motion court thereafter sought to move the case forward and inquired whether petitioner “want[ed] the full 45 days” to file pretrial motions.  Petitioner's counsel stated that the defense was “not asking for a motion schedule at this time” but also was not “waiving motions” and was “cognizant of [the] obligations under CPL 255.”  The court set a motion schedule, including, as relevant here, that the defense had until October 24, 2025 to file pretrial motions, and petitioner's counsel reiterated that the defense did not consent to the CPL 30.30 time for a motion schedule.  The defense ultimately did not file a pretrial motion by the October 24 deadline.

The People filed a Certificate of Compliance (COC) with discovery on December 1, 2025.  On December 2, 2025, petitioner filed a pretrial omnibus motion seeking, among other things, dismissal of the indictment, inspection of the grand jury minutes, and suppression of all evidence recovered when defendant was arrested.  Petitioner subsequently moved for his release pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) on the ground that the defense did not consent to the motion schedule.  As a result, the 95 days that elapsed since the beginning of the case on August 27, 2025 through December 2, 2025 were chargeable to the People, requiring petitioner's release.  The motion was denied.  Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on January 6, 2026 challenging the motion court's denial of his CPL 30.30 motion.  The petition was also denied.  The habeas court found that it was reasonable for the motion court to set a pretrial motion schedule and that the period between petitioner's August 27, 2025 arraignment in Criminal Court and his October 24, 2025 deadline to file pretrial motions was excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(a).  We agree.

Pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a), a defendant charged with a felony who “has been committed to the custody of the sheriff ․ must be released on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such conditions as may be just and reasonable” if the People are not “ready for trial” within 90 days of the defendant's commitment to custody.  The statute specifies that “[i]n computing the time within which the [P]eople must be ready for trial,” certain periods must be excluded, including “a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to ․ pre-trial motions ․ and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court” (CPL 30.30[4][a] ).

CPL 255.20(1) requires that where a defendant is represented by counsel, “all pre-trial motions shall be served or filed within [45] days after arraignment and before commencement of trial,” with exceptions not relevant here as to when this time frame can be extended.

Petitioner asserts that the 45 days for filing pretrial motions, as prescribed by CPL 255.20, are not automatically excluded from the calculation of speedy trial time where, as here, the court sets a motion schedule over defense's objections.  Specifically, relying on the Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Meierdiercks, 68 N.Y.2d 613, 505 N.Y.S.2d 51, 496 N.E.2d 210 (1986), he argues that the sua sponte adjournment period from the August 27 arraignment to the December 2 filing of his omnibus motion should have been charged against the People, requiring his release from custody.

However, by relying on Meierdiercks, defendant conflates the express consent requirements under CPL 30.30(4)(b) with the less restrictive terms under CPL 30.30(4)(a) at issue in this case.  Meierdiercks focused solely on whether the challenged adjournment period in that case was excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(b).  CPL 30.30(4)(b) provides that an adjournment period is excludable only if it was granted “at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or her counsel.”  It did not involve pretrial motions pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(a), which has no such consent requirement (see e.g. People v. Garrett, 182 A.D.2d 496, 497, 582 N.Y.S.2d 189 [1st Dept. 1992] ).

In any event, the delay here, which resulted from a pretrial motion schedule as opposed to a mere adjournment, was not imposed sua sponte.  Notwithstanding defense counsel's statement that the defense was not asking for a motion schedule at that time, defense expressly stated defendant was “not waiving motions” and was “cognizant of [the] obligations under CPL 255” (cf.  People v. Collins, 82 N.Y.2d 177, 181, 604 N.Y.S.2d 11, 624 N.E.2d 139 [1993];  People v. Liotta, 176 A.D.2d 110, 110–111, 573 N.Y.S.2d 286 [1st Dept. 1991], affd 79 N.Y.2d 841, 580 N.Y.S.2d 184, 588 N.E.2d 82 [1992] ).  As the People observe, defendant sought the benefit of both positions.  He wanted to reserve his right to file motions but also prevent the People from relying on CPL 30.30(4)(a)'s exclusion.  This posture is not supported by the statute governing next steps after arraignment on an indictment and could arguably amount to gamesmanship under the guise of strategy.  The court's reliance on defendant's statements in implementing the motion schedule to move the case forward and to comply with CPL 255.20, was “an exercise of discretion resting on a rational basis and thus beyond correction in habeas corpus” (People ex rel. Parker v. Hasenauer, 62 N.Y.2d 777, 779, 477 N.Y.S.2d 320, 465 N.E.2d 1256 [1984];  see People ex rel. Lazer v. Warden, 79 N.Y.2d 839, 840, 580 N.Y.S.2d 183, 588 N.E.2d 81 [1992] ).

Once the court set a motion schedule based on defense counsel's representations, the period from the date of arraignment to the deadline set by the court fell squarely within the “reasonable period of delay” for “pre-trial motions” that “must be excluded” under CPL 30.30 (CPL 30.30[4][a];  see Matter of People ex rel. Farbman v Brann, 197 A.D.3d 1054, 1054, 151 N.Y.S.3d 881 [1st Dept. 2021];  Garrett, 182 A.D.2d at 497, 582 N.Y.S.2d 189).

Contrary to petitioner's contentions, the fact that the COC was not filed until after the October 24 pretrial motion deadline is irrelevant (see People v. Louis, 85 Misc.3d 476, 219 N.Y.S.3d 914 [Sup. Ct., Kings County 2024] [“(CPL 245.20) does not support defendant's argument that the 45–day deadline for filing a pretrial omnibus motion is extended from the date of the district attorney's final discovery disclosure and the filing of the COC”] ).  The Legislature in amending the People's discovery obligations pursuant to CPL 245.20 and CPL 245.50, has not tied those obligations to the timeframe in which the defense is required to file its pretrial motions.  In fact, CPL 255.20 permits the court to preclude defense motions if filed untimely without good cause.  We thus do not find that the conduct by the motion court was an impermissible sua sponte adjournment or that the court erred in finding that the relevant time period was excludable.

Accordingly, Supreme Court correctly determined that petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief because fewer than 90 days were chargeable to the People for speedy trial release purposes.

We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.