PEOPLE v. JAMES (2026)

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (William Mogelescu, J.), rendered August 5, 2016, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of disorderly conduct, and sentencing him to time served, unanimously affirmed.

The evidence was legally sufficient to support defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348–349 [2007];  see also People v. Baque, 43 NY3d 26 [2024] ).  Defendant's intent to “cause [a] public inconvenience” or his “reckless creation of a risk thereof” was inferable from the circumstances (Penal Law § 240.20;  see People v. Theronier, 195 AD3d 558, 558 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1030 [2021] ).  He interfered with traffic by accelerating abruptly, nearly causing a collision and almost striking pedestrians, and by crossing a double yellow line (see People v. Moye, 90 AD3d 472, 472 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 926 [2012] ).  After being stopped, he refused commands to exit his car and then had an aggressive confrontation with police, punching an officer and repeatedly screaming “murder,” which drew a large crowd (see Penal Law § 240.20[1];  People v. Poole, 128 AD3d 576, 577 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1111 [2016] ).  His punching of an officer on a crowded street further supported his conviction (see People v. Brunner, 248 A.D.2d 241, 242 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 970 [1998] ).

Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the legality of the second stop the police made of his car (see People v. Beaker, 7 AD3d 468, 469 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 670 [2004] ), and we decline to reach it in the interest of justice.  Alternatively, we reject it on the merits.  The initial stop was supported by probable cause because defendant had made an illegal U-turn in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1161(a) (see People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 349 [2001] ).  The police also had probable cause for the second stop as defendant abruptly entered traffic, cut off another vehicle, nearly struck pedestrians, and crossed a double yellow line, violating multiple Vehicle and Traffic Law provisions (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1126;  1128[a];  1146[a];  1180[a];  Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 349).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is unreviewable on direct appeal “because it involves matters not reflected in the record and, thus, must be raised in a CPL 440.10 motion” (People v. Holder, 224 AD3d 513, 514 [1st Dept 2024], lv denied 41 NY3d 1018 [2024] ).  Insofar as his claim is reviewable, defendant fails to demonstrate the “absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations” for counsel's conduct (People v. Carver, 27 NY3d 418, 420 [2016] ).

Defendant's claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by allowing an officer to testify falsely finds no support in the record.  His claim that the People committed a Brady violation is unpreserved (see People v. Ennis, 11 NY3d 403, 414 n 2 [2008], cert denied 556 U.S. 1240 [2009] ), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.  Alternatively, we reject it on the merits because the alleged prior inconsistent statement, which was disclosed to defendant through the complaint and the Civilian Complaint Review Board report, was not exculpatory or impeaching, and defendant does not show he was prejudiced by its alleged nondisclosure (see People v. Rong He, 34 NY3d 956, 958 [2019] ).

Finally, defendant was not denied his right to a speedy appeal.  The 10–year delay between the filing of the notice of appeal and appeal's perfection was attributable to defendant's refusal to work with his assigned attorneys, three of whom were relieved before current appellate counsel (see People v. Perez, 23 NY3d 89, 100 [2014], cert denied 574 U.S. 893 [2014] ).