IN RE: ALEKSANDER GURALNY (2026)

of Aleksander Guralny,

Deceased.

 File No.2019–1818

Ulmet Law Offices PLLC, New York (Luc Ulmet of counsel), for Natalia Olegivna Gurlana and Igor Guralny, respondents.

Rodman and Campbell, P.C., Bronx (Jessica F. Nelson of counsel), for The Public Administrator of the County of the Bronx, respondent.

Order, Surrogate's Court, Bronx County (Nelida Malave–Gonzalez, J.), entered on or about July 8, 2025, which denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections and approving the petition and granted objectants-respondents' cross-motion to the extent of (i) declaring the trust null and void, (ii) ordering that the decedent's estate be distributed pursuant to EPTL 4–1.1, (iii) vacating the decree issued in the administration proceeding and revoking the letters issued to petitioner, (iv) appointing the Bronx County Public Administrator as the estate's administrator, and (v) directing a kinship hearing, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The decedent Aleksander Guralny died intestate on December 25, 2018 and was survived by four distributes including objectants-respondents Natalia Olegivna Gurlana and Igor Guralny.  Petitioner is an alleged cousin of the decedent who was named as a co-trustee of the Aleksander Guralny Revocable Trust (the trust) and who obtained letters of administration for the decedent's estate.  Petitioner filed the instant proceeding to judicially settle her account and to distribute the decedent's assets pursuant to the disposition directives of the trust.  Objectants-respondents filed objections seeking to distribute the decedent's estate pursuant to EPTL § 4–1.1, not the trust.

A lifetime trust is only valid “as to any assets therein to the extent the assets have been transferred to the trust”;  “transfer is not accomplished by recital of assignment, holding or receipt in the trust instrument” (EPTL 7–1.18;  see also Matter of Bishop v. Maurer, 73 AD3d 455, 455 [1st Dept 2010] ).  Here, it is undisputed that no assets were transferred to the subject lifetime trust during the decedent's life.  As such, there were no assets to be distributed in accordance with the trust's instructions for distribution after death.

Even if the gift by implication doctrine may properly be applied in circumstances such as these (an issue we do not decide), its application would not be proper here because it is not unmistakably clear that the decedent intended to distribute his entire estate pursuant to the terms of the trust (see Matter of Bieley, 91 N.Y.2d 520, 526 [1998] [the gift by implication doctrine provides that “where the entire will unquestionably reveals a conscientious effort to provide for a complete disposition of decedent's property, but the testator has inadvertently failed to foresee every eventuality, the presumption against intestacy may be applied and a gift by implication found”];  Matter of Warren, 143 AD3d 1110, 1112 [3d Dept 2016] ).  The plain text of the trust agreement makes clear that the decedent's intent was only to dispose of trust assets via the trust.  Yet, no assets were ever transferred to the trust.  We cannot speculate as to why the trust remained unfunded at the time of the decedent's death.