GOLDBERG v. ROZENBERG (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Raymond P. Fernandez, J.), entered November 18, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants' motion (mot seq. no. 003) to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, unanimously affirmed, without costs.  Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered November 19, 2025, denying, as moot, plaintiff pro se's motion for injunctive relief (mot seq. no. 002), unanimously dismissed, without costs, as abandoned.  Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered on or about November 13, 2025, denying, as moot, plaintiff's motion to hold defendants in contempt (mot seq. no. 004), unanimously dismissed, without costs, as abandoned.  Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered on or about November 13, 2025, denying, as moot, plaintiff's motion for an order directing defendants to retain legal counsel unaffiliated with defendant Stein Saks PLLC and enjoining Stein Saks attorneys from entering an appearance in the action (mot seq. no. 005), unanimously dismissed, without costs, as abandoned.  Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered November 19, 2025, which denied, as moot, plaintiff's motion to amend the caption, to strike all filings and submissions by defendant Judah Stein, Esq., and for an order directing defendants to obtain duly admitted counsel and referring the matter to the Attorney Grievance Committee to investigate violations of Judiciary Law § 478 by defendants (mot seq. 007), unanimously dismissed, without costs, as abandoned.

Supreme Court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.  Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for defamation, as the allegedly defamatory statements were made in the course of litigation and were therefore protected by an absolute privilege (see Gottwald v. Sebert, 40 N.Y.3d 240, 253, 197 N.Y.S.3d 694, 220 N.E.3d 621 [2023] ).  Defendants asserted that plaintiff committed a crime by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, thereby violating Judiciary Law § 478 — a statement manifestly relevant to whether plaintiff, who is not an attorney, was entitled to represent a corporation in a Civil Court proceeding.

Plaintiff's assertion that the statements cited in the complaint were not pertinent to the Civil Court proceeding is without merit, especially considering the Court of Appeals holding that “a ‘sham exception’ [to the litigation privilege] is inconsistent with the absolute privilege recognized by this Court for statements made in connection with judicial proceedings” (Gottwald, 40 N.Y.3d at 253, 197 N.Y.S.3d 694, 220 N.E.3d 621).  Moreover, there is a liberal standard applied when determining whether a statement is pertinent to a particular litigation (see Flomenhaft v. Finkelstein, 127 A.D.3d 634, 637, 8 N.Y.S.3d 161 [1st Dept. 2015] [to be actionable, the offending statement must have been “outrageously out of context”];  see also Sexter & Warmflash, P.C. v. Margrabe, 38 A.D.3d 163, 173, 828 N.Y.S.2d 315 [1st Dept. 2007] [any doubts as to relevance are to be resolved in favor of pertinence] ).  Plaintiff's contention that the defamatory statement was made with malice for the purpose of retaliating against him is also without merit.  The question of malice is irrelevant to a determination of whether the litigation privilege applies, as the absolute privilege confers immunity from liability regardless of motive (see id.).

Supreme Court properly dismissed the cause of action for abuse of process, as it was based on the defamation cause of action, which was properly dismissed.

The cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was also properly dismissed.  Defendants' statements concerning plaintiff's violation of Judiciary Law § 478 were not so outrageous in character and extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and therefore do not support an IIED cause of action (see McGough v. Phillips & Assoc., PLLC, 245 A.D.3d 563, 563, 250 N.Y.S.3d 505 [1st Dept. 2026] ).

Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  As plaintiff concedes, he did not request leave to amend the complaint, and as a result, did not provide a draft amended complaint or establish the merits of any proposed new allegations (see CPLR 3025[b];  Non–Linear Trading Co. v. Braddis Assoc., 243 A.D.2d 107, 116, 675 N.Y.S.2d 5 [1st Dept. 1998] ).

Plaintiff has abandoned his appeals from the remaining orders, as he does not raise any arguments regarding them on appeal (see McNaughton v. 5 W. 14 Owners Corp., 235 A.D.3d 471, 475, 227 N.Y.S.3d 299 [1st Dept. 2025], lv to appeal dismissed in part, denied in part 45 N.Y.3d 960, 254 N.Y.S.3d 455, 278 N.E.3d 444 [2026] ).

We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.