IN RE: SHAIQUIDA B. HAYES (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, respondent-petitioner father appeals from an order that, inter alia, modified a prior custody order by continuing petitioner-respondent mother's sole legal and physical custody of the child and ordered that the father shall not have parenting time with the child. We affirm.

At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute that there has been a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an inquiry into whether a modification of the prior custody order is in the child's best interests, inasmuch as both parties filed competing petitions alleging such change in circumstances (see Matter of Hernandez v McGowan, 246 AD3d 1482, 1483 [4th Dept 2026]).

Contrary to the father's contention, Family Court's determination that the father shall not have parenting time with the child has a sound and substantial basis in the record. “A court’s custody determination, including its evaluation of a child’s best interests, is entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed as long as it is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Sheridan v Sheridan, 129 AD3d 1567, 1568 [4th Dept 2015]; see Matter of Burns v Herrod, 132 AD3d 1336, 1337 [4th Dept 2015]; Matter of LaMay v Staves, 128 AD3d 1485, 1485-1486 [4th Dept 2015]). Here, the evidence at the hearing established that the father and the child had a strained relationship and that the father taunted and teased the child. The evidence further established that the father refused to take accountability for his actions and did not believe that his actions were responsible for the deteriorating relationship between them. In addition, a psychologist's report was admitted in evidence, wherein the psychologist concluded that the father lacked of emotional self-regulation when angry, which was distressing to the child and contributed to his reluctance to visit the father. Even assuming, arguendo, that it was error to admit evidence from child protective services, we conclude that any error in receiving that evidence is harmless (see Matter of Jones v Jones, 160 AD3d 1428, 1429 [4th Dept 2018]; Matter of Heinsler v Sero, 147 AD3d 1342, 1342 [4th Dept 2017]).

Contrary to the father's contention, we conclude that the court did not err in ordering that the father's substantial compliance, engagement and progress with intensive individual counseling, with anger management and parenting components, shall constitute a change of circumstances for the purposes of any future modification petitions (see generally Matter of Allen v Boswell, 149 AD3d 1528, 1529 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 902 [2017]; Matter of Cramer v Cramer, 143 AD3d 1264, 1265 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 913 [2017]). Contrary to the father's further contention, the court's order in that respect did not improperly order the counseling as a prerequisite to visitation (see generally Allen, 149 AD3d at 1529-1530).

Entered: October 9, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court