DENZEL FULLER PLAINTIFF APPELLANT v. CITY OF BUFFALO CITY OF BUFFALO POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICER MATTHEW SERAFINI OFFICER JENNA HORNBERGER OFFICER WILLIAM LIS DETECTIVE SERGEANT HARVEY FRANKEL DETECTIVE JENNIFER ZANGHI LIEUTENANT LINDA STANCHACK OFFICER JOHN FECIO DEFENDANTS RESPONDENTS ET AL DEFENDANTS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action asserting causes of action for, inter alia, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, under the common law and in violation of 42 USC § 1983. This action arises out of plaintiff's arrest for assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (§ 265.01 [2]) for fighting with an off-duty police officer (complainant) and subsequently brandishing a pocket knife outside a bar that both men were patronizing. The charges against plaintiff were eventually dismissed after the prosecutor reviewed video footage of the fight, which revealed that the complainant was the initial aggressor in the encounter when he sucker punched plaintiff in the head after a brief verbal dispute. Plaintiff now appeals from an order granting the motion of defendants-respondents (City defendants) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims against them, and we affirm.

We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted the motion and dismissed the complaint against the City defendants. Initially, we conclude, and plaintiff correctly concedes, that the court properly dismissed the complaint to the extent asserted against defendant City of Buffalo Police Department inasmuch as that defendant “is merely an administrative unit of defendant City of Buffalo, [and therefore] it cannot be independently sued” (Taylor v City of Buffalo, 229 AD3d 1125, 1125 [4th Dept 2024]; see also Village of Brockport v County of Monroe Pure Waters Div., 75 AD2d 483, 486-487 [4th Dept 1980], affd 54 NY2d 678 [1981]).

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, we conclude that the court properly granted the motion with respect to the causes of action against the remaining City defendants for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. “The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest[,] malicious prosecution,” and abuse of process (Harmon v City of Buffalo, 187 AD3d 1644, 1644 [4th Dept 2020]; see Snow v Schreier, 193 AD3d 1346, 1347 [4th Dept 2021]; San George v Eden Cent. School Sys., 6 AD3d 1139, 1140 [4th Dept 2004]). “Generally, probable cause is established where an identified crime victim communicates to the arresting officer information affording a credible ground for believing the offense was committed and identifies the accused as the perpetrator” (Harmon, 187 AD3d at 1644-1645 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]; Chambers v Town of Shelby, 211 AD3d 1456, 1458 [4th Dept 2022]). “[T]he issue of probable cause is a question of law to be decided by the court only where there is no real dispute as to the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn from such facts ․ Where there is ‘conflicting evidence, from which reasonable persons might draw different inferences[,] ․ the question [is] for the jury’ ” (Parkin v Cornell Univ., 78 NY2d 523, 529 [1991]; see Harmon, 187 AD3d at 1645; Burgio v Ince, 79 AD3d 1733, 1734 [4th Dept 2010]).

Here, we conclude that the City defendants met their initial burden with respect to the challenged causes of action by establishing that the police officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff (see Chambers, 211 AD3d at 1458; Harmon, 187 AD3d at 1645). The City defendants’ evidence in support of the motion, including, inter alia, deposition testimony from the responding and arresting officers, established that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on statements made to the police by the complainant and other witnesses to the fight that plaintiff was the initial aggressor in the fight and that, after the encounter with the complainant, plaintiff had brandished a knife. Additionally, the City defendants submitted evidence that, at the time the police responded to the scene of the fight, they reasonably—albeit, ultimately inaccurately—believed that plaintiff may have lacerated the complainant's arm with the knife.

In opposition to the motion, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Plaintiff submitted the testimony of the complainant, which did not materially diverge from the evidence submitted by the City defendants in support of finding probable cause for plaintiff's arrest. Similarly, we note that plaintiff's own affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to whether the police had probable cause on the night in question (see Harmon, 187 AD3d at 1645).

As a consequence of our determination that there was probable cause to support plaintiff's arrest, we further conclude that the City defendants established that the police officers involved in this matter are entitled to qualified immunity from suit (see id.; Morris v City of Buffalo, 151 AD3d 1723, 1723-1724 [4th Dept 2017]). Therefore, based on the above, we conclude that the court properly granted the motion. In light of our determination, plaintiff's remaining contentions are academic.

Entered: October 9, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court