THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK RESPONDENT v. JONAY ROBINSON DEFENDANT APPELLANT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her, upon a jury verdict, of one count of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]), one count of assault in the first degree (§ 120.10 [1]), two counts of assault in the second degree (§ 120.05 [2]), and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [3]). The conviction arises from an incident in which defendant drove her live-in boyfriend (codefendant) to an apartment complex where, shortly after their arrival, the codefendant engaged in a shooting in which numerous rounds of ammunition were discharged. A three-year-old boy was struck and killed, and three more people were wounded. We affirm.

Defendant contends that, with respect to the murder and assault counts of which she was convicted, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish her liability as an accessory. We reject that contention. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude that, with respect to each of those charges, there is “a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences to support the conclusion that defendant had a shared intent, or community of purpose with the principal, in carrying out the [charged offense], and that defendant intentionally aided the principal in bringing forth [the] result” (People v Duran, 239 AD3d 1307, 1308 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1010 [2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Gause, 230 AD3d 1573, 1574-1575 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 930 [2025]; see generally Penal Law § 20.00). Here, in addition to the evidence establishing that defendant drove the codefendant to the location where the shooting occurred, it is reasonable to infer based on the trial evidence that defendant was aware that the codefendant was armed with an unconcealed military-type rifle, which he used during the shooting (see generally People v Brown, 240 AD3d 1278, 1282-1283 [4th Dept 2025]). The evidence further established that defendant remained at the scene for the duration of the shooting, and then drove away with the codefendant in the vehicle after the shooting (see generally People v McGee, 87 AD3d 1400, 1402 [4th Dept 2011], affd 20 NY3d 513 [2013]; Duran, 239 AD3d at 1308). Importantly, the People introduced, inter alia, evidence of defendant's social media activity, which further supports the conclusion that defendant was a knowing accomplice in the criminal offenses in question (see generally People v Lewis-Bush, 204 AD3d 1424, 1425 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1072 [2022]).

Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the murder and assault crimes of which defendant was convicted as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we reject defendant's further contention that the verdict with respect to those crimes is against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review her contention that a law enforcement witness was not qualified to give opinion testimony regarding the meaning of certain slang terms used by defendant on social media (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Garcia-Santiago, 60 AD3d 1383, 1383 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 915 [2009]; see also People v Graham, 174 AD3d 1486, 1488 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1016 [2019]), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). To the extent that defendant contends that County Court otherwise abused its discretion in permitting the testimony, we reject defendant's contention (see generally People v Powell, 37 NY3d 476, 479-480 [2021]; People v Parker, 240 AD3d 66, 70-71 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 43 NY3d 1047 [2025]).

We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in declining to sentence her pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (see Penal Law § 60.12). Deferring to its credibility determinations (see People v Jazmine D.S., 243 AD3d 1204, 1205-1206 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 937 [2026]), we conclude that the court did not err in determining that there was no evidence of physical abuse “at the time of” the shooting (§ 60.12 [1] [a]; see People v Felix E., 244 AD3d 1815, 1816 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 970 [2025]), and that any such abuse was not a “significant” contributing factor to defendant's criminal behavior (see People v Krista M.G., 228 AD3d 1300, 1301 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1036 [2024]).

Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, her sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: October 9, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court