ARTHUR WONG v. KENNETH WONG YU DAN WONG (2026)

Freshfields U.S. LLP, New York (Aaron Pultman of counsel), for appellant.

Law Offices of Dean T. Cho, LLC, Forest Hills (Dean T. Cho of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (James G. Clynes, J.), entered May 6, 2025, based on a jury verdict, declaring plaintiff the sole and rightful owner of the cooperative shares in the Hillman Housing Corporation and the associated cooperative apartment located at 530 East Grand Street, Ap. 8E, New York, New York 10002, and dismissing defendant Yu Dan Wong's counterclaims, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, the judgment vacated, and the matter remanded for a new trial.

Defendant Yu Dan Wong properly preserved the issues that she raises on this appeal by making specific objections on the basis of relevance and law of the case, as well as multiple mistrial motions (see Beach v. Touradji Capital Mgt., LP, 179 AD3d 474, 477 n [1st Dept 2020] ).  Under the circumstances we find that she was not required to also request curative instructions in connection with each of these objections.

In previously dismissing plaintiff's claim against his former sister-in-law, defendant Yu Dan Wong, for maintenance and other charges incurred by her when she occupied the subject cooperative apartment, and finding that issues of fact existed surrounding whether plaintiff is entitled to a judgment declaring that he is the sole owner of the shares of the apartment and that Yu Dan Wong has no ownership rights in the apartment or right to occupy it, this Court found that “the 2004 agreement executed by plaintiff, his brother Kenneth Wong, and an officer of the nonparty cooperative, together with the 2004 stock certificate signed by two officers of the cooperative, unequivocally granted plaintiff's brother certain rights to the shares to the apartment under their plain terms.”  Thus the only question of fact that remained was, “whether the 2012 transfer from plaintiff's brother back to plaintiff constituted an actual or constructive fraudulent conveyance” (Wong v. Wong, 203 AD3d 451, 451 [1st Dept 2022] ).  This finding constitutes law of the case (see Carmona v. Mathisson, 92 AD3d 492, 492–93 [1st Dept 2012] ).

Notwithstanding this, over Yu Dan Wong's repeated objections, the trial court allowed plaintiff's counsel to argue and elicit testimony that Kenneth Wong was never a real owner of the apartment and could not have transferred it to plaintiff, fraudulently or otherwise.  The court's instructions to the jury, inter alia, that any testimony concerning “any alleged oral agreement between Arthur Wong and Kenneth Wong is irrelevant to whether or not Kenneth became an owner of the apartment in January 2004” and that such evidence “is only relevant to Kenneth's state of mind” was too late to have the intended effect (see Boyd v. Blessey, 96 A.D.2d 816, 817 [2d Dept 1983] ).  To be effective, a curative instruction must be “given at the first opportunity after the improper testimony had been heard” (Martelly v New York City Health & Hosps.  Corp., 276 A.D.2d 373, 373 [1st Dept 2000] ).  In any event, plaintiff's counsel ignored the admonition, without repercussion.

The testimony and argument related to the issue of Kenneth Wong's ownership of the cooperative shares may have played a substantial role in the jury's decision to find in favor of plaintiff (see Bryant v. Christopher Hyland, Inc., 115 AD3d 525, 526 [1st Dept 2014];  American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Schindler El. Corp., 291 A.D.2d 467, 468 [2d Dept 2002] ).  The court's errors in permitting this issue to permeate the trial, together with plaintiff's counsel's multiple inflammatory, irrelevant, and baseless remarks directed at defendant and her counsel in the presence of the jury, require remand for a new trial.

We need not reach defendant's remaining grounds for reversal, because we are ordering a new trial.