IN RE: B.R. (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lisa A. Sokoloff, J.), entered October 31, 2025, which granted the motion of Matthew Carmody, co-guardian of the person and property of A.C., an incapacitated person (IP), for expanded authority to change the beneficiary designation on the IP's Wells Fargo account so that petitioners B.R. and G.C. were the primary beneficiaries of that account, unanimously affirmed, with costs.  Order, same court and Justice, also entered on or about October 31, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted petitioners' request to authorize the co-guardian to change the beneficiary designation on the IP's Wells Fargo and Chase guardianship accounts to make them the beneficiaries of that account;  granted the request to reform the Dynamic Residential LLC, ASC Apartments LLC, and Foresee LLC Operating Agreements such that upon dissolution, the IP's 50% interest would transfer to petitioners;  and found that the aforementioned LLCs were dissolved, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in authorizing the co-guardian to change the beneficiary designations on the stated accounts so that petitioners, the IP's children, rather than interested party-appellant S.C., the IP's wife, were the beneficiaries (see Helen Hayes Hosp. v. DeBuono [In re Shah], 95 N.Y.2d 148, 160 [2000] ).  Mental Hygiene Law § 81.21(a) expressly permits the relief sought by the co-guardian upon a finding that an IP would have made proposed transfers if he or she had the requisite capacity to act and if a reasonable person in the circumstances would have made them (see Matter of Modesta V. [Maya V.], 107 AD3d 1008, 1009 [2d Dept 2013] ).  The court properly made these findings, relying on the IP's 2002 estate plan, which he never changed.  That plan reflected his testamentary intent to leave half of his and appellant's wealth to petitioners.  It provided that the surviving spouse would receive the couple's assets in a trust, and upon the death of the surviving spouse, the assets would be divided equally between the IP's children and appellant's nieces and nephew.  The court's directives were necessary to restore that plan as appellant executed a new will, facilitated by her nephew after the article 81 was commenced, and did not represent that its provisions would not have an effect on the inheritance to which petitioners were entitled under the IP's estate plan.

The co-guardian's application satisfied the requirements of Mental Hygiene Law § 81.21(b) in that it stated the specific property at issue, the proposed disposition of that property, whether the IP had previously executed a will or similar instrument, and the terms of that instrument (see Mental Hygiene Law § 81.21[b][3],[4], [6] ). Supreme Court also properly addressed the factors set forth in Mental Hygiene Law § 81.21(d)(1)-(6).

We reject appellant's assertion that Mental Hygiene Law § 81.21 is limited to lifetime transfers, and that Supreme Court therefore lacked the statutory authority to direct a modification to the beneficiary designation on a guardianship account.  The proposed transfers are authorized by Mental Hygiene Law §§ 81.21(a)(1), (3), (6), and (8) as gifts or expectant interests that extend beyond the life of the IP.

We also reject appellant's contention that a settlement agreement that the parties executed in connection with the article 81 proceeding forecloses the relief sought.  The settlement agreement expressly provides that any party may seek judicial intervention upon a showing of good cause and a change in circumstances.  Supreme Court correctly found that the co-guardian had made such a showing in light of appellant's new will, which was executed at a time when the IP lacked the capacity to change his estate plan in a way that would assure the preservation of his testamentary intent.

Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by declaring that the LLCs were dissolved, nor did it abuse its discretion by reforming the operating agreements to convey the IP's interest to petitioners instead of permitting appellant to continue to operate the companies.  From 2016 onward, the IP was unable to manage his affairs due to vascular dementia and progressive memory loss, and the court properly concluded on that basis that the IP's condition constituted a “disability” under paragraphs 11(a) and (b) of the LLCs' operating agreements.  As appellant notes, the operating agreements provided that appellant could continue the business if, within 180 days of the IP's disability, she indicated in writing that she consented to operate the business with the IP's successor-in-interest.  However, appellant presented no evidence that she complied with this requirement;  the settlement agreement, which pre-dated the incapacity finding, does not qualify and does not contain the requisite language.

We have considered appellant's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.