THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK RESPONDENT v. JESSIE MURRAY DEFENDANT APPELLANT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by reducing the period of postrelease supervision imposed on count 6 of the superseding indictment to one year and reversing those parts convicting defendant of criminal possession of a firearm under counts 3 and 5 of the superseding indictment and dismissing those counts, and as modified the judgment is affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [3]), two counts of criminal possession of a firearm (§ 265.01-b [1]), one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16 [1]), and one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree (§ 220.09 [1]).

Defendant contends that County Court erred in denying that part of his omnibus motion seeking to suppress physical evidence on the ground that police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to pursue him when he fled after exiting the codefendant's vehicle. We reject that contention. Evidence at the suppression hearing established that police officers had observed defendant with the codefendant earlier in the day and that they had reasonable suspicion to believe the codefendant was armed. When the officers attempted to stop the vehicle that the codefendant was driving, the codefendant led the officers on a high-speed chase. When the vehicle stopped, defendant exited from the passenger side and fled with a black “fanny-pack-style” bag swinging from his arm. During the suppression hearing, an officer testified that illegal items, including drugs and guns, “are commonly passed around [a] vehicle while” suspects are attempting to evade police and that “an individual that flees the vehicle will be in possession of those items,” while individuals not in possession of any contraband will remain in the vehicle. He further testified that it was “common for individuals to secrete handguns” in “fanny-pack-style bags” like the one that defendant carried from the vehicle. Contrary to defendant's contention, the court properly determined that the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to pursue and detain him based on the combination of his flight in response to the approach by the officers and the abovementioned specific circumstances indicating that defendant may have been engaged in criminal activity (see People v Parker, 32 NY3d 49, 56-57 [2018]; see also People v Wright, 240 AD3d 1304, 1307 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1069 [2026]; People v Bachiller, 93 AD3d 1196, 1197-1198 [4th Dept 2012]).

Defendant further contends that the court erred in denying that part of his second omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds. In particular, he contends that the People's initial certificate of compliance (COC) was improper and that the corresponding statement of readiness (SOR) was thus illusory because the People failed to disclose certain lab results until they filed a supplemental COC. Contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the People “had complied with their automatic discovery obligations under CPL article 245 to the extent possible” (People v Geer, 224 AD3d 1353, 1354 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 970 [2024]) at the time they filed the initial COC and SOR because the lab results disclosed with the supplemental COC were not provided to the People until shortly before the supplemental COC was filed (see People v Everett, 250 AD3d 1246, 1250 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 1037 [2026]). Defendant further contends that the supplemental COC was invalid because the People failed to disclose certain Molineux evidence, including a police report of a separate incident in which the codefendant was shot. We agree with the People that the evidence was not subject to automatic discovery under CPL 245.20 because “it does not relate to the subject matter of the case” (People v Speed, 244 AD3d 1734, 1736 [4th Dept 2025]).

As the People correctly concede, the sentence on the count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree is illegal insofar as the period of postrelease supervision exceeds two years (see Penal Law § 70.45 [2] [b]). We therefore modify the judgment by reducing the period of postrelease supervision imposed on that count to one year (see People v Moore [appeal No. 1], 78 AD3d 1658, 1658 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 798 [2011]; see also People v Sessons, 121 AD3d 1580, 1580 [4th Dept 2014]). The sentence as modified is not unduly harsh or severe. We note, however, that those parts of the judgment convicting defendant of criminal possession of a firearm under counts 3 and 5 of the superseding indictment must be reversed and those counts dismissed because they are inclusory concurrent counts of the two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (see People v Stewart, 244 AD3d 762, 765 [2d Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 939 [2026]; see also People v Harvey, 214 AD3d 672, 673 [2d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 929 [2023]). We therefore further modify the judgment accordingly.

Entered: October 2, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court