THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK RESPONDENT v. TYRIQUE GRIFFIN DEFENDANT APPELLANT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of one count of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). We affirm.

Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground, inter alia, that he was under the influence of narcotics and alcohol during the plea proceeding. On appeal, he contends that County Court abused its discretion in summarily denying his motion. As a threshold issue, we note that defendant's contention that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered survives even a valid waiver of the right to appeal (see generally People v Davis, 129 AD3d 1613, 1613-1614 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 966 [2015]).

It is well established that “[p]ermission to withdraw a guilty plea rests solely within the court's discretion ․, and refusal to permit withdrawal does not constitute an abuse of that discretion unless there is some evidence of innocence, fraud, or mistake in inducing the plea” (People v Alexander, 203 AD3d 1569, 1570 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1031 [2022] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Floyd, 210 AD3d 1530, 1530 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 1072 [2023]). “ ‘[O]nly in the rare instance will a defendant be entitled to an evidentiary hearing; often a limited interrogation by the court will suffice. The defendant should be afforded [a] reasonable opportunity to present [their] contentions and the court should be enabled to make an informed determination’ ” (People v Harris, 206 AD3d 1711, 1711-1712 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1188 [2022], quoting People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927 [1974]). Moreover, “a court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea where the defendant's allegations in support of the motion are belied by the defendant's statements during the plea proceeding” (People v Fox, 204 AD3d 1452, 1453 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 940 [2022] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, defendant's statements during the plea colloquy belie his claim that he was intoxicated at the time of the plea proceeding. Defendant repeatedly denied being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and we conclude that the record of the plea proceeding establishes “that defendant's factual allocution was lucid and detailed and that defendant understood both the nature of the proceedings and that he was [forfeiting and] waiving various rights” (People v Watson, 169 AD3d 1526, 1528 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 982 [2019]).

While defendant contends that the court erred in denying the motion without conducting a hearing, that contention is not supported by the record. Quite the contrary, the court permitted defendant to call witnesses and conduct an evidentiary hearing; he simply elected not to do so. To the extent that defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective in choosing to forgo a hearing on the motion, that contention involves matters outside the record on appeal and is properly the subject of a CPL article 440 motion (see generally People v Johnson, 81 AD3d 1428, 1428 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 896 [2011]).

We likewise reject defendant's contention that the court erred in failing to recuse itself. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant's pro se letter is sufficient to preserve his present contention, we conclude that it is without merit. “It is well settled that, ‘[u]nless disqualification is required under Judiciary Law § 14, a judge's decision on a recusal motion is one of discretion’ ” (People v Hazzard, 129 AD3d 1598, 1598 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 968 [2015], quoting People v Glynn, 21 NY3d 614, 618 [2013]). “[W]hen recusal is sought based upon impropriety as distinguished from legal disqualification, the judge ․ is the sole arbiter” (People v Sides, 215 AD3d 1250, 1252 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 936 [2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 406 [1987]). Here, defendant concedes that there was no mandatory basis for disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14 and he made no showing, whether below or on appeal, that the court displayed actual bias (see Sides, 215 AD3d at 1252), and under the circumstances of this case we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to recuse itself.

Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant did not validly waive his right to appeal (see People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545, 564-566 [2019], cert denied 589 US 1302 [2020]), we conclude that defendant's sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.

Entered: October 2, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court