INTERASIAN DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD v. PARK (2026)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Arlene P. Bluth, J.), entered February 2, 2026, against defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $3,690,995.04 plus $5,515,256.70 in pre-judgment interest from July 1, 2009, and $775.00 in costs and disbursements, for a total amount of $9,207,026.74, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, the judgment vacated, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment denied, defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment granted, and the second amended complaint dismissed.  The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.  Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered December 16, 2025, which granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its second amended complaint and denied defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the second amended complaint, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment.

Initially, we reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court should have applied either Malaysian or Massachusetts law.  Defendant “was estopped from contending that New York law did not apply after having relied on it in this litigation” for more than a decade (AIG Trading Corp. v. Valero Gas Mktg., 254 A.D.2d 117, 118 [1st Dept 1998];  see Public Adm'r of County of N.Y. v Frota Oceanica Brasileira, 222 A.D.2d 332, 333–334 [1st Dept 1995], lv dismissed 88 N.Y.2d 920 [1996] ).

Nevertheless, we reverse on two separate grounds.  First, plaintiff failed to proffer evidence in admissible form, as all of its evidence was submitted by way of an attorney affirmation that failed to substantially conform to the language of CPLR 2106, which requires any affirmation to explicitly state that it is made “under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment” (see Grandsard v. Hutchison, 2024 WL 1957086, *1, 2024 N.Y. LEXIS 72914, *1–2 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Apr. 26, 2024, Latin, J., index No. 153605/24], affd without op 227 AD3d 491 [2024] ).

Second, even if we were to accept the defective affirmation and consider the evidence annexed thereto, we would find that defendant was not a participant in her ex-husband's alleged fraudulent conveyances (see former Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273–276).  “Liability is imposed on parties who participate in the fraudulent transfer of a debtor's property and are transferees of the assets and beneficiaries of the conveyance” (Constitution Realty v. Oltarsh, 309 A.D.2d 714, 716 [1st Dept 2003] [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Schwartz v. Boom Batta, Inc., 137 AD3d 512, 513 [1st Dept 2016] ).  The testimony and submitted documents show that plaintiff and defendant's ex-husband jointly owned an LLC over which the ex-husband exercised full control;  defendant had no involvement in the formation of the LLC or its operation;  the ex-husband transferred the LLC's assets to his personal bank account and to a joint bank account he shared with defendant while they were married;  the ex-husband was in charge of the family finances;  the ex-husband paid their tax liabilities from his individual account;  and the ex-husband caused regular bills to be paid from the joint bank account.  Plaintiff identifies nothing beyond defendant's joint ownership of one bank account upon which to hold her liable in her ex-husband's alleged scheme to fraudulently transfer assets (Schwartz, 137 AD3d at 513).