IN RE: S.G. (2026)

Order of fact-finding and disposition (one paper), Family Court, New York County (Pamela B. Scheininger, J.), entered on or about February 5, 2025, which determined, after a hearing, that respondent father committed two counts of the family offense of menacing in the third degree and granted a two-year order of protection in favor of petitioner mother, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent placed petitioner in fear of “death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury” through his aggressive words and actions and thus committed the family offense of menacing in the third degree (Matter of I.E. v J.I., 233 AD3d 608, 608 [1st Dept 2024] ).  Family Court aptly credited petitioner's testimony that in February 2023 respondent berated her, used offensive language, called her names and used threatening gestures, causing her to experience fear.  She also testified that in October 2023, respondent threatened to break her neck during an argument and was aggressive in his words and gestures, which caused petitioner to be terrified.  Family Court's determination crediting petitioner's testimony as to these two incidents is entitled to great deference and there is no basis to disturb the court's findings (see Matter of Everett C. v Oneida P., 61 AD3d 489, 489 [1st Dept 2009] ).

Respondent's argument that Family Court committed reversible error when it denied his motion to preclude petitioner from presenting evidence at trial based on her failure to respond to his demand for a bill of particulars is unavailing.  In denying the motion, the court noted that no trial date had been set, petitioner did not have legal counsel when the request was made, and respondent had not suffered any prejudice from petitioner's failure to respond to his demands.  There is no indication that respondent subsequently renewed his demand or that petitioner's failure to respond was willful and contumacious as required to warrant preclusion (see Randazzo v Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 284 AD2d 158, 158 [1st Dept 2001] ).

Respondent also argues that the court erred by granting the two-year order of protection in favor of petitioner without holding a separate dispositional hearing.  However, this argument is raised for the first time on appeal and is unpreserved (see Matter of Elizabeth F. v Wilfredo F., 220 AD3d 615, 616 [1st Dept 2023] ).  In any event, there is no statutory requirement for a separate dispositional hearing in Family Court Act article 8 proceedings (see Matter of K.F. v F.T., 243 AD3d 506, 508 [1st Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 904 [2026] ), and, contrary to respondent's contention, he “waived his right to a dispositional hearing, as he did not demand, or object to the court's failure to hold, such a hearing” (Matter of Tonya B. v Matthew B., 90 AD3d 463, 463 [1st Dept 2011] ).