IN RE: L.M. (2026)

This matter brings before the Court the issue of to what extent the Administration for Children's Services may utilize the provision in Family Court Act § 1054 stating that a nonrespondent to whom a child is released must “submit to the jurisdiction of the court” at the post dispositional stage of the child protective proceedings, and what may be ordered under that provision.  For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that the fact-finding and dispositional order dated May 31, 2024, which placed a nonrespondent mother, Sasha C. (the mother), under the broad powers of ACS' supervision, was unlawful and represented a broad overreach beyond the scope of power permitted by Family Court Act § 1054 and in contravention of its purpose.

By petition dated December 21, 2023, ACS alleged that respondent father ¹ neglected the three subject children by committing acts of domestic violence against nonrespondent mother in the children's presence.  The allegations in the petition stemmed from an investigation that the court ordered upon the mother's filing of a family offense petition against the father on December 12, 2023.  At the initial appearance on December 21, 2023, ACS requested a full stay-away temporary order of protection against the father on behalf of the mother and children, with an exception for supervised visitation.  Family Court issued the temporary order of protection and further ordered that the children be “temporarily released to the nonrespondent mother under ACS supervision and household monitoring” although the children had not been removed from her care.

What followed was five months of pre-fact-finding supervision by ACS of the mother and children, which included caseworkers making announced and unannounced home visits to their apartment.  These visits sometimes required the children to be pulled out early from afterschool activities and sports events, or to miss them entirely.  ACS also called the children's school and interviewed the children, and on at least one occasion interrupted the children's visit with their maternal grandmother in the hospital, forcing them to rush home to meet with a caseworker who had come to the home without advance notice.  Notably, the mother was not accused of wrongdoing or named in ACS's neglect petition.  Yet ACS conducted about 10 home visits in the five months preceding fact-finding simply because she reported experiencing domestic violence.  These searches entailed a thorough search of the entirety of the home, including the mother's bedroom, the bathroom, the children's bedroom, and the contents of her refrigerator.

During this period, ACS never raised any concerns about the mother's compliance with the temporary order of protection, the condition of her home, the care she provided the children, or her ability to protect the children from harm.  In fact, the January 2, 2024 court-ordered investigation report noted that the children appeared “healthy and well,” they were doing well in school, and their home environment posed no immediate danger to them.

On May 30, 2024, the father consented, without admission, to the court entering a neglect finding against him as alleged in the petition.  The court then proceeded to disposition.  As relevant here, ACS requested an order directing the father to complete various programs, comply with the modified temporary order of protection issued on behalf of the mother and children (which prohibited the father from having in-person visitation with the children without supervision by an ACS-approved resource), submit to ACS supervision, and comply with any recommendations or reasonable referrals.  The court stated that it would “release” the children to the mother under “ACS supervision and household monitoring” for a period of nine months.  The mother expressed her intent to return with her two youngest children to Florida that July. She requested, given that there were no reported issues, that supervision be concluded prior to the move.  Counsel for ACS, who acknowledged that they were aware of the impending move to Florida, indicated that they planned to continue supervision by conducting “video visits with the children.”  By order of fact-finding and disposition dated May 31, 2024, Family Court, among other things, released the children to the mother under “ACS supervision and household monitoring for nine (9) months.”  The order further stated that “not later than 60 days prior to the expiration of this order,” ACS was to report to the court, the attorney for the children, the parties, and the mother any actions contemplated by ACS with respect to the family.  The order was set to expire on February 28, 2025.

In July 2024, the mother and children moved to Tampa, Florida.  Despite ACS's assurances that supervision would be limited to video visits with the children, 10 virtual visits of their Florida home were conducted with limited warning beforehand.  These video visits involved the caseworker virtually inspecting the kitchen, living room, bathroom, and children's bedroom, as well as the contents of the refrigerator.  The caseworker also required the mother to send a video of the entire apartment, including footage of her own bedroom.  Furthermore, the caseworker would often call or text the mother unexpectedly and demand to speak to the children.  These unannounced virtual visits with ACS would often interrupt the mother's work day, and the mother reported that the children would be upset for the remainder of the day after speaking with the caseworker.  The mother was also instructed to provide the caseworker with the children's medical and educational records, and despite her compliance, ACS still made separate calls to the children's school directly.

ACS also enlisted Florida law enforcement to conduct inspections on its behalf.  The mother alleges, without rebuttal in the record, that this is ACS's pattern for out-of-state families, even for nonrespondents not charged with wrongdoing.

In August 2024, marshals were sent to the home of the mother's friend, where the mother and children had stayed in the weeks after they first arrived in Florida, and demanded to see the children and conduct a search of the premises.  Notwithstanding the Florida monitoring, the mother received a call from the tenant renting her New York apartment, who reported that ACS caseworkers had come looking for the children there as well, shared personal information about the children with the tenant, and threatened to “keep knocking doors” until the children were located.

In October 2024, armed sheriffs came unannounced to the children's school, demanding that the children be pulled out of their respective classrooms.  The children were then interviewed on school premises in a semipublic space, much to the children's embarrassment and distress.  The elder child, who began crying and shaking, was so inconsolable that the principal of the school instructed the mother to take her home early that day.  The child was so humiliated by the encounter, which had taken place in view of other students, including her friends, that she did not wish to return to school.  Furthermore, the child, who had up until this point never exhibited any behavioral issues, began to act out in school a week or two after this encounter.  The attorney for the children reported that it took months for the child to recover from this dysregulation.

Moreover, on December 26, 2024, the day after Christmas, two armed sheriffs came to the mother's home looking for the children.  They demanded to enter and inspect the home and announced, in voices loud enough to be overhead, that they were there due to the mother's ACS case.

On February 28, 2025, the day that supervision of the mother and children was set to expire, ACS moved by order to show cause to extend the order of supervision for three months pursuant to Family Court Act § 1054.  ACS argued that the extension was necessary because the father failed to complete his required services.  In furtherance of their argument, ACS submitted a report dated February 27, 2025, which stated, among other things, that aside from having issues obtaining the mother's address in Florida, the mother had complied with virtual assessments of her home, which was found to be clean and appropriate for the children and equipped with all required safety measures.  The report further noted that the mother allowed ACS access to the children and there were “no concerns.”  The mother had also provided ACS with the children's report cards, which demonstrated their perfect attendance, and that both children had passed with high grades.  The mother also provided the children's medical records, which showed that both children had their annual physicals and were up to date on their immunizations.

The report did not explain when or how ACS ultimately obtained the mother's address, though it presumably was able to do so by December 2024, as the sheriffs made an in-person unannounced visit to the mother's home.  Nor did ACS offer an explanation as to why it failed to comply with the May 31, 2024 order's notice requirement informing the court, parties, and nonrespondent of its intention to request extension of supervision within 60 days before expiration of the order.  Nevertheless, Family Court issued an interim order granting extension of supervision and the order of protection pending determination of ACS's motion to extend.

On March 3, 2025, the parties appeared before Family Court on ACS's motion.  The mother and children, through their attorneys, vehemently objected to an extension of supervision, reiterating that there was no basis to continue supervision, and described the humiliation they had experienced as a result of ACS's supervision, arguing that ACS's constant interference was negatively impacting their lives.

When asked if ACS was seeking to extend supervision over the mother, ACS answered in the affirmative and reiterated that the basis for their request for an extension was due to the father's failure to comply with the terms of the order of disposition.  None of the reasons cited by ACS pertained to a concern for the children's welfare in their mother's care or were a result of her noncompliance with the order of disposition.  They averred that they were willing to work with the mother “to determine the least invasive way in order to continue to monitor the children's welfare.”  On that same date, the court issued an order tolling the supervision pending disposition of ACS's motion and ordered that ACS conduct twice monthly scheduled video visits with the mother and children in the interim.  The court clarified, however, that the children were not to be coerced to speak with ACS.

On April 2, 2025, the mother moved to vacate all orders placing her under supervision.  On April 11, 2025, ACS moved to set aside and vacate the order entered by the court pursuant to ACS's February 28, 2025 motion, which extended supervision over the mother and children, and to terminate the March 3, 2025 order of supervision on the ground that it was impractical to continue supervising the mother and children as they resided in Florida.  On April 22, 2025, Family Court denied ACS's February 28, 2025 motion seeking an extension of supervision over the mother for failure to demonstrate good cause to extend it, and further deemed the mother's motions moot.

It is worthy of note that ACS does not dispute any of the factual allegations made by the mother, but instead maintains that their supervision of the mother and the children was reasonable and comported with Family Court Act § 1054.

Although the order of supervision has expired, the mother's appeal, directed at ACS's extrajudicial pattern of practice of employing Family Court Act § 1054 to seek supervision orders over nonrespondent parents at the post dispositional stage of the proceeding, raises a substantial and novel issue that is likely to evade review, and warrants the application of the exception to the mootness doctrine (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714–715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980];  Matter of Malachi B. [Administration for Children's Servs.], 228 A.D.3d 570, 570–571, 214 N.Y.S.3d 41 [1st Dept 2024] ).

Family Court erred when it placed the mother and her entire household under sweeping, overbroad, and unchecked “ACS supervision and household monitoring” in its May 31, 2024 order of fact-finding and disposition.  The error was compounded by the issuance of the February 28, 2025 order extending the supervision despite the lack of good cause shown or a sound basis in the record.  Such conditions of supervision run afoul of the power and purpose of Family Court Act § 1054.  While the statute provides that a court may direct a nonrespondent parent to undertake certain actions with respect to the child released into their care to ensure their accessibility for services, appointments, visitation and the like, it is clear, based on the unambiguous language in the statute, that the court may not place a parent who has not been accused of any wrongdoing under ACS supervision at the postdispositional stage of the proceeding (id.;  cf.  Family Court Act § 1057).  Even were we to accept ACS's argument that the mother acquiesced to its request for supervision at the May 30, 2024 disposition, her agreement is irrelevant.  It bears noting that the supervision proposed by ACS on that date to conduct “video visits with the children,” was a departure from the supervision that was exercised by ACS postdisposition.

To the extent that ACS argues that Family Court's temporary extension of supervision over the mother's household was reasonable given, among other things, the mother's history of “failing to report the father's neglect by domestic violence,” we once again find that ACS's policy of pursuing supervision in such cases “reinforces the coercive control underpinning abusive relationships, turns survivors into suspects, and requires the nonrespondent parent to answer for the respondent parent's abusive behaviors” and that adhering to such a policy would permit ACS to continue surveillance of the mother simply because the child's father committed acts of domestic violence against her (Matter of R.A. [A.R.], 244 A.D.3d 11, 21, 239 N.Y.S.3d 139 [1st Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted] ).  We reject this policy based on its faulty and unlawful premises (cf.  Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 371–372, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196, 820 N.E.2d 840 [2004] ).

ACS's argument that Family Court Act § 1054 generally authorizes Family Court to require supervision of nonrespondent parents to whom a child is released is directly contravened by the express language of the statute.  Further, we find that there was no basis for Family Court to have imposed any of the enumerated conditions referenced in Family Court Act § 1054 here.  The mother never objected to cooperating and complying with the children's court-ordered virtual visitation with the father, or with the terms of the order of protection, or to the children's required meetings with their attorney or ACS caseworker.  Accordingly, there was no basis for an order under Family Court Act § 1054 directing her to cooperate (see Matter of R.A., 244 A.D.3d at 20, 239 N.Y.S.3d 139).  Indeed, by the time the dispositional order was issued, ACS had already been supervising the mother and children for approximately six months and voiced no concerns about the mother's willingness to enforce the order of protection and take appropriate steps should the father violate the order of protection against him.  Nor were concerns voiced about the mother's willingness to make the children available for visits or appointments.

Because this case can be resolved on statutory grounds, we need not reach the merits of the parties' constitutional claims (see Matter of Syquia v. Board of Educ. of Harpursville Cent. School Dist., 80 N.Y.2d 531, 535, 591 N.Y.S.2d 996, 606 N.E.2d 1387 [1992] ).

Accordingly, the order, Family Court, Bronx County (Hari K. Singh, J.), entered on or about April 22, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied ACS's February 28, 2025 motion to temporarily extend supervision over the mother for failure to demonstrate good cause, and deemed the mother's April 2, 2025 motion seeking to vacate the prior supervision orders and ACS's April 11, 2025 motion seeking to terminate temporary supervision should be affirmed, without costs.  The appeal from order of fact-finding and disposition (one paper), same court and Justice, entered on or about May 31, 2024, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, released the children to the mother with nine months of ACS supervision and household monitoring should be dismissed, without costs, as superseded by the order entered on or about April 22, 2025.  The appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered on or about March 3, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, directed ACS to conduct twice-monthly video visits to the mother's home, should be dismissed, without costs, as academic.  The appeal from order, same court (Rantideva Singh, J.), entered on or about February 28, 2025, which temporarily extended and tolled ACS supervision pending a determination of its motion seeking to extend supervision for three additional months, should be dismissed, without costs, as academic.

M–5931 – Matter of D./M.

Motion for leave to file an amici curae brief, granted.

M–6032 – Matter of D./M.

Motion for leave to file an amici curae brief, granted.

M–6083 – Matter of D./M.

Motion for leave to file an amici curae brief, granted.

M–6092 – Matter of D./M.

Motion for leave to file an amici curae brief, granted.

M–6102 – Matter of D./M.

Motion for leave to file an amici curae brief, granted.

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Hari K. Singh, J.), entered on or about April 22, 2025, affirmed, without costs.  Order of fact-finding and disposition (one paper), same court and Justice, entered on or about May 31, 2024, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, released the children to the mother with nine months supervision and household monitoring dismissed, without costs, as superseded by the order entered on or about April 22, 2025.  Order, same court and Justice, entered on or about March 3, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, directed ACS to conduct twice monthly video visits to the mother's home dismissed, without costs, as academic.  Order, same court, (Rantideva Singh, J.), entered on or about February 28, 2025, which temporarily extended and tolled ACS supervision pending a determination of its motion seeking to extend supervision for three additional months dismissed, without costs, as academic.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Respondent was deemed to be a person legally responsible for the oldest of the three subject children.  That child, however, has since reached the age of majority and is no longer a subject child in this matter.  Respondent is the father of the two younger children.

Rosado, J.

All concur.