IN RE: RANDY SPENCER (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.

Memorandum: In this CPLR article 78 proceeding transferred to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g), petitioner, a retired firefighter for respondent City of Fulton (City), seeks to annul the City's determination that adopted the findings and recommendation of the Hearing Officer and denied petitioner's application for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). Petitioner contends that he was permanently disabled due to an injury resulting from the performance of his duties and that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence.

At the outset, we note that, inasmuch as the petition raises a substantial evidence question, Supreme Court should have “transferred the entire CPLR article 78 proceeding to this Court” (Matter of Waterfront Operations Assoc. LLC v New York State Dept. of Health, 243 AD3d 1320, 1321 [4th Dept 2025], appeal dismissed 45 NY3d 943 [2026] [internal quotation marks omitted]). We therefore treat the proceeding as if it had been properly transferred and review the parties’ contentions de novo (see id.; Matter of Corbett v Schroeder, 214 AD3d 1407, 1407-1408 [4th Dept 2023]; Matter of Quintana v City of Buffalo, 114 AD3d 1222, 1223 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 902 [2014]).

Upon conducting that review, we conclude that the determination is supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence is a minimal standard that requires less than a preponderance of the evidence and demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable” (Matter of Tunstall v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 233 AD3d 1488, 1490 [4th Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Roenbeck v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 221 AD3d 1013, 1014 [2d Dept 2023]). Where substantial evidence supports an administrative determination, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency, even if we would have decided the matter differently (see Tunstall, 233 AD3d at 1490).

At the hearing, petitioner presented evidence that he was involved in an on-duty motor vehicle accident while he was driving a City fire truck on March 7, 2019, and that he suffered neck and right shoulder injuries that rendered him physically unable to return to work as a firefighter. Petitioner's evidence included testimony from a physician who began treating petitioner for complaints of neck and right arm pain on March 28, 2019. Although the physician did not review any of petitioner's medical records from before March 7, 2019, the physician opined that petitioner's injuries were caused by the motor vehicle accident. While the City did not dispute that petitioner was permanently disabled, the City's examining physician testified that petitioner's prior medical history indicated that his injuries began before March 7, 2019, and were the result of chronic degeneration. The physician thus opined that petitioner's injuries were preexisting and not caused by the motor vehicle accident. The Hearing Officer found both physicians to be credible but found the opinion of the City's expert more persuasive in light of the physician's review of petitioner's pre-accident medical history. The Hearing Officer “was entitled to weigh the parties’ conflicting medical evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and [w]e may not weigh the evidence or reject [the Hearing Officer's] choice where the evidence is conflicting and room for a choice exists” (Matter of Erie County Sheriff’s Police Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Erie, 159 AD3d 1561, 1562 [4th Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Childs v City of Little Falls, 109 AD3d 1148, 1149 [4th Dept 2013]).

We have reviewed petitioner's remaining contention and conclude that it does not require a different result.

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court