THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLANT v. LOUIE HARRIS LOUIS HARRIS HORNSBY DEFENDANT RESPONDENT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, the motion is denied, counts 1 through 3 of the indictment are reinstated, and the matter is remitted to Erie County Court for further proceedings on the indictment.

Memorandum: In this prosecution arising from defendant's alleged forcible, nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the alleged victim, the People appeal from an order that granted defendant's motion to dismiss counts 1 through 3 of the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds as a result of the People's failure to provide all discovery required by CPL 245.20, which rendered any certificate of compliance improper and thereby rendered any statement of trial readiness pursuant to CPL 30.30 illusory. We previously assumed, arguendo, that the certificate of compliance was improper and the statement of readiness was illusory, and we held this case, reserved decision, and remitted the matter to County Court to calculate any periods of excludable time for speedy trial purposes and determine whether the People were ready within the requisite six-month time period under CPL 30.30 (1) (a) (People v Harris, 240 AD3d 1175, 1176 [4th Dept 2025]). Upon remittal, the court determined that less than six months of delay was chargeable to the People.

Where, as here, a defendant is charged with a felony, the People must announce readiness for trial within six calendar months of the commencement of the criminal action (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; People v England, 84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994], rearg denied 84 NY2d 846 [1994]; People v Jordan, 220 AD3d 1187, 1188 [4th Dept 2023]). “The statutory period is calculated by ‘computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion’ ” (People v Barnett, 158 AD3d 1279, 1280 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1078 [2018]; see People v Ernst, 240 AD3d 1252, 1255 [4th Dept 2025]; People v Broughton, 239 AD3d 1406, 1406 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1010 [2025]).

Here, the People had 181 days in which to become ready for trial. Based on our review of the record and the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the People established that fewer than 181 days of delay were chargeable to them and thereby “met their burden of demonstrating ‘sufficient excludable time’ ” (People v Lawrence, 231 AD3d 1497, 1501 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 945 [2025]; see People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 338 [1985]). Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the People's certificate of compliance was improper and that the statement of readiness was therefore illusory, inasmuch as the total period of time chargeable to the People was less than the six months allowable in this case, we further conclude that the People did not violate defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial (see Lawrence, 231 AD3d at 1501; Jordan, 220 AD3d at 1188). We therefore reverse, deny defendant's motion, reinstate counts 1 through 3 of the indictment, and remit the matter to County Court for further proceedings on the indictment.

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court