THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK RESPONDENT v. ISAAC HUBBERT DEFENDANT APPELLANT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of one count of criminal contempt in the first degree (Penal Law § 215.51 [c]), and four counts of aggravated family offense (§ 240.75 [1]), arising from his violations of a no-contact order of protection in favor of a protected person. We affirm.

We reject defendant's contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. With respect to defendant's argument that defense counsel was ineffective for not facilitating defendant's testimony before the grand jury, defendant's argument lacks merit inasmuch as defendant did not establish that he was prejudiced by that purported failure or that the outcome would have been different if he had testified (see People v Williams, 235 AD3d 1245, 1246 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 43 NY3d 1059 [2025]; People v Lostumbo, 182 AD3d 1007, 1009 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1046 [2020]; People v Robinson, 151 AD3d 1701, 1701-1702 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1133 [2017]). We similarly reject defendant's contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 190.50 (5) (c). Here, such a motion would have been unsuccessful inasmuch as defendant did not serve the requisite written notice upon the District Attorney that he intended to testify before the grand jury (see CPL 190.50 [5] [a]), and it is well settled that “[t]here can be no denial of effective assistance of ․ counsel arising from [defense] counsel's failure to ‘make a motion or argument that has little or no chance of success’ ” (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005], quoting People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277, 287 [2004], rearg denied 3 NY3d 702 [2004]). We have examined defendant's remaining allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and conclude that they lack merit. Viewing the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of this case in totality and as of the time of representation, we conclude that defense counsel provided meaningful representation (see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).

To the extent that defendant contends that Supreme Court erred when it denied without a hearing that part of defendant's omnibus motion seeking suppression of evidence on the ground that the police lacked probable cause to detain him, we reject that contention. Evaluating “(1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant's access to information” (People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 [1993]), we conclude that defendant's factual allegations were too conclusory to warrant a hearing and the court did not err in summarily refusing to suppress the evidence (see People v Bakerx, 114 AD3d 1244, 1246 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 1196 [2014]; see generally People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 587 [2006]). Here, defendant, in conclusory fashion, alleged that he was “detained, stopped, seized, and placed in police custody on a warrantless basis” without offering any further details, and defendant “failed to make any averments with respect to the circumstances of his arrest, the police actions prior to detaining him, or his conduct before or during the encounter” (People v Fuller, 147 AD3d 1344, 1344 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1031 [2017]; see People v Forbes, 244 AD3d 1819, 1819-1820 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 970 [2026]). Thus, defendant failed to put forth sufficient facts that “as a matter of law support the ground alleged” (CPL 710.60 [3] [b]).

Defendant's contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction is unpreserved for our review because defendant's general motion for a trial order of dismissal was not “ ‘specifically directed’ at” any alleged shortcoming in the evidence now raised on appeal (People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]; see People v Ford, 148 AD3d 1656, 1657 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1079 [2017]). Nevertheless, “ ‘we necessarily review the evidence adduced as to each of the elements of the crimes in the context of our review of defendant's challenge regarding the weight of the evidence’ ” (People v Stepney, 93 AD3d 1297, 1298 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 968 [2012]). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Even assuming, arguendo, that a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we conclude the jury did not fail to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded (see id.). “Where, as here, witness credibility is of paramount importance to the determination of guilt or innocence, we must give great deference to the jury, given its opportunity to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor” (People v Streeter, 118 AD3d 1287, 1288 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1068 [2014], reconsideration denied 24 NY3d 1047 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court erred in failing to recuse itself (see People v Dewiel, 100 AD3d 1524, 1525 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1010 [2013]; People v Strohman, 66 AD3d 1334, 1336 [4th Dept 2009], lv dismissed 13 NY3d 911 [2009]). In any event, that contention is without merit (see Matter of Wilson v Brown, 162 AD3d 1054, 1055-1056 [2d Dept 2018]; People v Barnes, 156 AD3d 1417, 1419 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 31 NY3d 1078 [2018]; Strohman, 66 AD3d at 1335-1336).

To the extent defendant challenges the validity of the order of protection, defendant failed to object at sentencing to the issuance of the order of protection on behalf of the victim and thus failed to preserve his challenges for our review (see People v Loverde, 151 AD3d 1738, 1739 [4th Dept 2017]). We decline to exercise our power to review defendant's challenges as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see id.).

Finally, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court