THE IDEAL YOU WEIGHT LOSS CENTER LLC PLAINTIFF APPELLANT v. SHERI ZILLIOUX DOING BUSINESS AS IDEAL WEIGHT LOSS OF BUFFALO AND IDEAL WEIGHT LOSS OF BUFFALO LLC DEFENDANTS RESPONDENTS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff, an authorized weight loss clinic of Ideal Protein of America Inc. (Ideal Protein), commenced this action seeking money damages and injunctive relief based on allegations that defendants, another Ideal Protein clinic and the former employee of plaintiff who operates that clinic, caused harm to plaintiff's business by engaging in unfair competition, violating General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, and diluting plaintiff's trade name. Plaintiff now appeals from an order entered following a nonjury trial insofar as it dismissed the amended complaint. We affirm.

Where, as here, the appeal follows a nonjury trial, “the Appellate Division has ‘authority ․ as broad as that of the trial court ․ and ․ may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts’ ” (Sweetman v Suhr, 159 AD3d 1614, 1615 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 913 [2018], quoting Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; see Buchmann v State of New York, 214 AD3d 1412, 1413 [4th Dept 2023]). “Nonetheless, the decision of the fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Unger v Ganci [appeal No. 2], 200 AD3d 1604, 1605 [4th Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Thoreson v Penthouse Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 495 [1992], rearg denied 81 NY2d 835 [1993]; Davis v Hinds, 215 AD3d 1242, 1243 [4th Dept 2023]). Moreover, when conducting such a review, we must view the record “in the light most favorable to sustain the [order or] judgment” (Farace v State of New York, 266 AD2d 870, 871 [4th Dept 1999]; see A&M Global Mgt. Corp. v Northtown Urology Assoc., P.C., 115 AD3d 1283, 1286 [4th Dept 2014]).

Upon conducting that review, we conclude that there is a fair interpretation of the evidence supporting Supreme Court's well-reasoned determinations. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, we conclude that a fair interpretation of the evidence supports the court's determination that plaintiff failed to prove that defendants’ use of their trade name and other activities “ ‘have caused confusion with, or have been mistaken for, ․ plaintiff's activities in the mind of the public, or are likely to cause such confusion or mistake’ ” (KG2, LLC v Weller, 105 AD3d 1414, 1415 [4th Dept 2013]; see generally Camelot Assoc. Corp. v Camelot Design & Dev., 298 AD2d 799, 800 [3d Dept 2002]). Moreover, as the court correctly determined, even if plaintiff had proved the confusion element of its common-law cause of action for unfair competition, the evidence presented by plaintiff was insufficient to establish that it suffered “ ‘losses [that] were a proximate result of defendants’ conduct’ ” (E.J. Brooks Co. v Cambridge Sec. Seals, 31 NY3d 441, 449 [2018]). Contrary to plaintiff's further contentions, we conclude that a fair interpretation of the evidence also supports the court's determination that plaintiff failed to prove its claims under General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 (see Morwitz v De Angelis, 155 AD3d 514, 514 [1st Dept 2017]) and its cause of action alleging injury to business reputation and dilution of trade name (see § 360-l; Qedi’s Corp. v 3 Bros. Pizza Café, Inc., 176 AD3d 1131, 1131-1132 [2d Dept 2019]).

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court