GEORGE BUSHLEY CLAIMANT APPELLANT v. NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY DEFENDANT RESPONDENT CLAIM NO 139001 (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law and facts without costs, the claim is reinstated, judgment on liability is granted in favor of claimant, and the matter is remitted to the Court of Claims for a trial on the issue of damages only.

Memorandum: Claimant commenced this action seeking damages allegedly arising from an incident in which claimant's vehicle was struck by a snowplow operated by defendant's employee. At the time of the collision, claimant's vehicle was stopped at a red light in the right-hand northbound lane of the road; the snowplow was stopped at the same light in the left-hand northbound lane. Despite the presence of a no-turn-on-red sign, the snowplow made an illegal right turn from the left lane, against the red light, striking claimant's vehicle. Following a nonjury trial on the issue of liability, the Court of Claims determined that the claim was subject to the reckless disregard standard of care under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) inasmuch as the snowplow was actually engaged in work on a highway at the time of the accident. The court further determined that claimant failed to establish that the driver operated the snowplow with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Claimant appeals from the judgment dismissing his claim.

“Following a nonjury trial, the Appellate Division has authority ․ as broad as that of the trial court ․ and ․ may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts” (McDevitt v State of New York, 197 AD3d 852, 853 [4th Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; Sweetman v Suhr, 159 AD3d 1614, 1615 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 913 [2018]). Here, we conclude that judgment should have been rendered in favor of claimant, not defendant, and we therefore reverse.

We agree with claimant that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) does not apply to the facts of this case. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) “exempts from the rules of the road all vehicles, including [snowplows], which are ‘actually engaged in work on a highway’ ․, and imposes on such vehicles a recklessness standard of care” (Deleon v New York City Sanitation Dept., 25 NY3d 1102, 1105 [2015]; see generally Plummer v Town of Greece, 213 AD3d 1236, 1236 [4th Dept 2023]). “Although the exemption does not apply if the snowplow ․ [is] merely traveling from one route to another route ․, a snowplow may be engaged in work even if the plow blade [is] up at the time of the accident and no salting [is] occurring when the snowplow operator is nevertheless working his [or her] run or beat at the time of the accident” (Plummer, 213 AD3d at 1236-1237 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, the evidence at trial established that the snowplow driver's route consisted of a series of exits on I-190 in Buffalo, including the on-ramps and off-ramps, and that he would routinely travel on city streets, including the street on which the accident occurred, to access the next ramp on his route. Inasmuch as the testimony reflects that the snowplow driver did not have the authority to plow or salt city streets such as the one where the accident occurred, we conclude that, at the time of the accident, he “was not driving on part of his plow route but instead was traveling from one part of his route to another by way of a [municipal] road that he was not responsible for plowing” (Hofmann v Town of Ashford, 60 AD3d 1498, 1499 [4th Dept 2009]; see generally Arrahim v City of Buffalo, 151 AD3d 1773, 1773 [4th Dept 2017]).

Inasmuch as the snowplow driver admitted that he was aware that he was not permitted to make a right turn against a red light at the subject intersection, admitted that he was aware that other drivers treated that portion of road as having two northbound lanes, and nonetheless elected to make an illegal right turn on red from the left-hand lane, we conclude that the evidence established that the snowplow driver was negligent (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1111 [d] [2]; 1160; Pellegrino v Youll, 37 AD3d 1064, 1064 [4th Dept 2007]). We further conclude that claimant was not contributorily negligent inasmuch as he was lawfully on the roadway and stopped at a red light when struck (see Kelsey v Degan, 266 AD2d 843, 843 [4th Dept 1999]).

We therefore reverse the judgment, reinstate the claim, and grant

judgment in claimant's favor on the issue of liability, and we remit

the matter to the Court of Claims for a trial on damages.

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court