IN RE: MICHAEL J.L. (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, respondent father appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated his parental rights with respect to the subject child on the ground of permanent neglect (see § 384-b [4] [d]). We affirm.

We reject the father's contention that Family Court erred in finding that he permanently neglected the subject child. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that petitioner met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that it exercised diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parent-child relationship (see Social Services Law § 384-b [3] [g] [i]; [7] [a]). “Diligent efforts include reasonable attempts at providing counseling, scheduling regular visitation with the child, providing services to the parent[ ] to overcome problems that prevent the discharge of the child into their care, and informing the parent[ ] of [the] child's progress” (Matter of Jessica Lynn W., 244 AD2d 900, 900-901 [4th Dept 1997]; see § 384-b [7] [f]). Petitioner is not required, however, to “guarantee that the parent succeed in overcoming [their] predicaments” (Matter of Sheila G., 61 NY2d 368, 385 [1984]; see Matter of Jamie M., 63 NY2d 388, 393 [1984]). Rather, the parent must “assume a measure of initiative and responsibility” (Jamie M., 63 NY2d at 393). Here, petitioner met its burden by establishing that it referred the father to a birth parent specialist and mental health services, referred him to a parenting program multiple times, and encouraged visitation with the child (see Matter of Janette G. [Julie G.], 181 AD3d 1308, 1308-1309 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 907 [2020]).

Contrary to the further contention of the father, we conclude that, despite petitioner's diligent efforts, the father failed to plan for the child's future. “ ‘[T]o plan for the future of the child’ shall mean to take such steps as may be necessary to provide an adequate, stable home and parental care for the child” (Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [c]). “It is well settled that, to plan substantially for a child's future, the parent must take meaningful steps to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal within a reasonable period of time” (Matter of Patience E. [Victoria E.], 225 AD3d 1181, 1182 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 904 [2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Nathaniel T., 67 NY2d 838, 840 [1986]; Matter of Mayhon P.I. [Claudette P.], 240 AD3d 1444, 1445 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 910 [2026]). Here, the evidence established that the father failed to obtain suitable housing and failed to make adequate progress in the parenting and mental health services provided by petitioner (see Matter of Amiyah C. [Marcus C.], 246 AD3d 1481, 1482 [4th Dept 2026]; Patience E., 225 AD3d at 1182; see also Matter of Dagan B. [Calla B.] [appeal No. 3], 192 AD3d 1458, 1460 [4th Dept 2021], appeal dismissed 37 NY3d 977 [2021]) and thus did not “take steps to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the child from [his] home” (Nathaniel T., 67 NY2d at 840 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Jacob A. [Robert G.N.], 231 AD3d 1485, 1486 [4th Dept 2024]).

We reject the father's contention that the court violated his due process rights by proceeding without expert testimony and under Social Services Law § 384-b (4) (d) instead of § 384-b (4) (c), inasmuch as there were several grounds to support termination of his parental rights other than his mental health issues (see Social Services Law § 384-b [4]; Matter of Hime Y., 52 NY2d 242, 250-251 [1981]; cf. Matter of Albert S. [Albert S.], 238 AD3d 1510, 1511 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 906 [2025]).

Contrary to the father's further contention, we conclude that “the record supports the court's determination that termination of [his] parental rights is in the best interests of the child, and that a suspended judgment was not warranted under the circumstances inasmuch as any progress made by the [father] prior to the dispositional determination was insufficient to warrant any further prolongation of the child's unsettled familial status” (Matter of Kendalle K. [Corin K.], 144 AD3d 1670, 1672 [4th Dept 2016]; see Matter of Nolin X.A.C. [Nicky C.], 240 AD3d 1388, 1388-1389 [4th Dept 2025]; Matter of Moses K.B. [Ezra B.B.], 239 AD3d 1479, 1479 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 910 [2026]).

Finally, to the extent that the father contends that his right to a hearing before an impartial factfinder was violated because the court displayed bias throughout the proceeding, that contention is unpreserved for our review inasmuch as he did not file a motion for the court to recuse (see Matter of Anthony J. [Siobvan M.], 224 AD3d 1319, 1319 [4th Dept 2024]; Matter of Tartaglia v Tartaglia, 188 AD3d 1754, 1756 [4th Dept 2020]; Matter of Chromczak v Salek, 173 AD3d 1750, 1750 [4th Dept 2019]). We decline to exercise our power to review that contention in the interest of justice.