IN RE: HANALISE S. (2026)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

IN RE: HANALISE S., MOSES B., AND SOPHIA B. MONROE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; EZRA B.B., JR., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 1.)

552 Decided: July 24, 2026

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CURRAN, MONTOUR, AND GREENWOOD, JJ.

JULIE CIANCA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES A. HOBBS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. BRENDON S. FLEMING, ACTING COUNTY ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (MARY WHITESIDE OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. SUSAN E. GRAY, CANANDAIGUA, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD. MICHAEL J. CAPUTO, ROCHESTER, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, respondent appeals in appeal No. 1 from an order of protection issued in favor of the oldest subject child. In appeal No. 2, respondent appeals from an order of protection issued in favor of the two younger subject children. We previously held the case in appeal No. 2, reserved decision, and, among other things, directed the assignment of a new attorney for the subject younger children for the purpose of filing a brief on their behalf (Matter of Hanalise S. [Ezra B.B.], 247 AD3d 1580, 1581 [4th Dept 2026]). In light of that determination and in the interest of judicial economy, we also held the case in appeal No. 1 and reserved decision on that appeal pending the assignment of new counsel and the filing of a brief in appeal No. 2 (id.). Upon review following the completion of that briefing, we affirm in both appeals.

Here, respondent opposed petitioner's motion for the respective orders of protection; however, he did so solely on the ground that petitioner's motion was premature in light of a pending appeal from an order terminating his parental rights with respect to the subject younger children. Respondent therefore failed to preserve for our review his sole contention in both appeals that Family Court lacked the authority to impose the orders of protection pursuant to Family Court Act § 1056 (4) (see Matter of Ariel C.W.-H. [Christine W.], 89 AD3d 1438, 1438 [4th Dept 2011]; see generally Matter of Pauline E. v Renelder P., 37 AD3d 1145, 1146 [4th Dept 2007]). We decline to address that contention in the interest of justice. Contrary to respondent's related contention in his postargument submission, this is not a case where the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue an order of protection against respondent inasmuch as, here, respondent was an appropriate party in this proceeding (cf. Matter of Rizzo v Pravato, 170 AD3d 860, 861 [2d Dept 2019]; Matter of Parrella v Freely, 90 AD3d 664, 665 [2d Dept 2011]).

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court

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