IN RE: NATHAN TRIPODI (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner appeals from a Monroe County Court order that granted respondents’ motion to dismiss his appeal from a Rochester City Court order on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner, who had been convicted of grand larceny in the fourth degree, was found after an administrative hearing to have violated his conditions of parole, resulting in his parole being revoked and a 12-month term of incarceration being imposed. Petitioner appealed that determination in City Court pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (4-a), and City Court upheld the determination. We affirm.

Initially, although petitioner has served his sentence and the maximum expiration date of his period of postrelease supervision has passed, the appeal is not moot because a determination that petitioner violated the conditions of his parole is a “continuing blot on his record with potential future consequences” (People v Freeman, 169 AD3d 1513, 1513 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 976 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Shoga v Annucci, 197 AD3d 935, 936 [4th Dept 2021]; People v Wiggins, 151 AD3d 1859, 1859 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 954 [2017]).

Petitioner contends that he had the right to appeal the order of City Court to County Court. We reject that contention inasmuch as there is no constitutional or statutory authorization for the appeal. Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (4-a) (a), “when in a violation proceeding brought pursuant to this section, any of the charges sustained by the hearing officer would constitute a misdemeanor or felony if such charge were or had been brought in a criminal court, the releasee may, in lieu of an administrative appeal to the board pursuant to subdivision four of this section, appeal such determination to the lowest level of the following courts serving the jurisdiction in which the hearing was held or in which any such sustained conduct was alleged to have occurred: city court, district court, county court or supreme court; provided, however, that if any such misdemeanor or felony charge was prosecuted in any city, district, county or supreme court, such appeal shall be filed in that court.” The statute provides for one direct appeal as of right when, as here, petitioner chooses to appeal under section 259-i (4-a), and it is silent as to a second appeal following the § 259-i (4-a) appellate decision.

“As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself” (Matter of Raynor v Landmark Chrysler, 18 NY3d 48, 56 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “ ‘[W]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning’ ” (State of New York v Patricia II., 6 NY3d 160, 162 [2006]). We “cannot by implication supply in a statute a provision which it is reasonable to suppose the [l]egislature intended intentionally to omit” (Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Is. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 21 NY3d 55, 62 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Reclaim the Records v New York State Dept. of Health, 45 NY3d 1, 16 [2025]). Judges may not second-guess the legislature's policy choices or rewrite statutes to reflect their preferred outcomes (see Xiang Fu He v Troon Mgt., Inc., 34 NY3d 167, 172 [2019]).

Here, inasmuch as the “right to appeal depends upon express constitutional or statutory authorization” (Friedman v State of New York, 24 NY2d 528, 535 [1969]; see Gastel v Bridges, 110 AD2d 146, 146 [4th Dept 1985]) and there is no such authority for a second appeal, we conclude that the court properly granted the motion to dismiss petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court