LORI VIOLA CLAIMANT APPELLANT v. SUNY UPSTATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL UPSTATE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL AND STATE OF NEW YORK DEFENDANTS RESPONDENTS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the application is granted upon the condition that claimant shall file the proposed claim against defendants within 30 days of the date of entry of the order of this Court.

Memorandum: Claimant appeals from an order that denied her application seeking, in effect, permission to file a late claim against defendants SUNY Upstate University Hospital (Upstate), Upstate Community Hospital, and State of New York (collectively, State). Claimant contends that the Court of Claims abused its discretion in denying her application. We agree.

“[A] determination by the Court of Claims to grant or deny [an application] for permission to file a late ․ claim lies within the broad discretion of that court and should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion” (Phillips v State of New York, 179 AD3d 1497, 1498 [4th Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Mattison v State of New York, 246 AD3d 1425, 1426 [4th Dept 2026]; Malkan v State of New York, 145 AD3d 1601, 1601-1602 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 907 [2017]). Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) “enumerates six factors to be weighed ․ in connection with a late claim [application]: (1) whether the delay was excusable; (2) whether the State had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim; (3) whether the State had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim; (4) whether the claim appears to be meritorious; (5) whether the delay resulted in substantial prejudice to the State; and (6) whether the [applicant] has another available remedy. This list is not exhaustive and the presence or absence of any one factor is not dispositive; rather, the [c]ourt in its discretion balances these factors in making its determination” (Mattison, 246 AD3d at 1426 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v New York State Employees’ Retirement Sys. Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Sys., 55 NY2d 979, 981 [1982]; Stirnweiss v State of New York, 186 AD3d 1444, 1445 [2d Dept 2020]).

Here, the court considered the requisite factors and reasonably concluded that three of them—notice of the essential facts, opportunity to investigate, and lack of substantial prejudice to the State—favored claimant (see Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]; Mattison, 246 AD3d at 1426; see also Malkan, 145 AD3d at 1602). Indeed, the State did not dispute claimant's allegations that it had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim and an opportunity to investigate, nor did the State contest claimant's assertion that the delay had not resulted in substantial prejudice to the State (see Matter of Carvalho v State of New York, 176 AD2d 317, 318 [2d Dept 1991]).

With respect to the factor weighed most heavily by the court against claimant, i.e., whether she demonstrated the appearance of a meritorious claim, we note that a claimant seeking permission to file a late claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) “need not establish a prima facie case at this stage of the proceedings” (Mattison, 246 AD3d at 1427). “Rather, a claim has the appearance of merit if it is not ․ patently groundless, frivolous or legally defective, and the record as a whole ․ give[s] reasonable cause to believe that a valid cause of action exists” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Calverley v State of New York, 187 AD3d 1426, 1427 [3d Dept 2020]; see generally Santiago v State of New York, 218 AD3d 1268, 1270 [4th Dept 2023]).

In support of her application, claimant presented evidence, in the form of her sworn allegations and medical records, that, while being treated in the inpatient psychiatric unit at Upstate, she was restrained by security officers and nurses because she was engaging in self-harm or had refused medication and injection. According to claimant, security officers escorted her to a seclusion room and forcefully pinned her down, with several security officers lying on top of her while her left arm was underneath her body. Claimant's medical records confirmed that four security officers and two nurses were involved in the restraining incident. Claimant allegedly screamed out in pain, and a nurse told the security officers to get off of her. Consistent with claimant's allegations, the medical records establish that, as a result of the incident, claimant suffered a dislocated left elbow, which first required a closed reduction under sedation and placement of a cast and later required surgery under general anesthesia to correct the recurrent instability in her elbow and a complete tear of the ligament complex.

Contrary to the court's determination, we conclude that the evidence presented by claimant in support of the application demonstrates that the security officers and nurses may have caused her injuries, as she alleges, by negligently applying excessive force while attempting to restrain her (see generally Mojica v City of New York, 199 AD2d 250, 250 [2d Dept 1993]). Further, contrary to the State's assertion, to the extent that Upstate's account of the incident in the medical records suggests that claimant somehow dislocated her own elbow, that notation created at most a factual issue with respect to causation (see generally Mattison, 246 AD3d at 1427; Schnier v New York State Thruway Auth., 205 AD3d 958, 961 [2d Dept 2022]). Consequently, on this record, it cannot be said that “the claim raised is patently groundless, frivolous or legally defective” (Calverley, 187 AD3d at 1428; see Mattison, 246 AD3d at 1427; Felipe v State of New York, 242 AD3d 1386, 1387 [3d Dept 2025]). We thus conclude that claimant's submissions on the application are sufficient, at this stage in the proceedings, to demonstrate that there appears to be merit to her claim within the meaning of Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) (see Mattison, 246 AD3d at 1427).

Next, although the tardiness of claimant's attorney in obtaining and evaluating the medical records, despite having been retained 72 days after the claim accrued, amounts to a law office failure that does not constitute a reasonable excuse (see Decker v State of New York, 164 AD3d 650, 652 [2d Dept 2018]), the delay in seeking permission to file a late claim—about 12 weeks—was minimal (see Mattison, 246 AD3d at 1427; Stirnweiss, 186 AD3d at 1446; Matter of Smith v State of New York, 63 AD3d 1524, 1524-1525 [4th Dept 2009]).

Finally, even if claimant has a partial remedy available in the form of an action against the individual security officers and medical providers (see Stirnweiss, 186 AD3d at 1447), upon consideration of all of the factors, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying claimant's application (see Mattison, 246 AD3d at 1426-1427; Stirnweiss, 186 AD3d at 1447).

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court