IN RE: THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM J. DELINE (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the decree so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioners commenced this proceeding to compel an accounting of a credit trust and construe the will of their deceased father, whose will established the credit trust for the benefit of petitioners’ mother, now deceased. The father's will granted the mother a limited power of appointment of the remainder of the credit trust. The mother exercised the power of appointment in her will and distributed the remaining assets of the credit trust to her daughters and not petitioners.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, Surrogate's Court properly granted the motion of respondents Jill Sears and Vickie Flanagan to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners lacked standing. Pursuant to SCPA 2205 (1), a court may, upon appearing that it is for the best interests of the estate, make an order requiring a fiduciary to file an intermediate or final account. The court may do so either on its own initiative or on the petition of, inter alia, “a person interested” (SCPA 2205 [2]). SCPA 103 (39) defines “[p]erson interested” as “[a]ny person entitled or allegedly entitled to share as beneficiary in the estate or the trustee in bankruptcy or receiver of such person” (see Matter of Clifford, 204 AD3d 1397, 1398 [4th Dept 2022]).

Here, the Surrogate properly concluded that petitioners were not beneficiaries of the credit trust and thus lacked standing as a matter of law (see Clifford, 204 AD3d at 1398; Dineen v Pratt, 155 AD3d 610, 610 [2d Dept 2017]). We have considered petitioners’ remaining contentions and conclude that they lack merit.

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court