THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK RESPONDENT v. QUADMAINE ROBINSON DEFENDANT APPELLANT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [3]).

Contrary to defendant's contention, the imposition of consecutive sentences was not illegal. Where a defendant is charged with both criminal possession of a weapon in violation of Penal Law § 265.03 (3) and a different crime that has an element involving the use of that weapon, consecutive sentencing is permissible if “[the] defendant knowingly unlawfully possesses a loaded firearm before forming the intent to cause a crime with that weapon” such that the possessory crime has already been completed (People v Brown, 21 NY3d 739, 751 [2013]; see People v Boyd, 192 AD3d 1659, 1661 [4th Dept 2021]; People v Lozada, 164 AD3d 1626, 1627 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1174 [2019]). The People have the burden of establishing that consecutive sentences are legal, i.e., that the two crimes were committed through separate and distinct acts (see People v Houston, 142 AD3d 1397, 1399 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1146 [2017]). Where, as here, a defendant is convicted by a guilty plea, the People may rely on the allegations in the counts of the indictment to which the defendant pleaded guilty as well as the facts adduced during the plea allocution (see People v Dean, 8 NY3d 929, 931 [2007]; People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640, 644 [1996]; Boyd, 192 AD3d at 1661).

Here, the facts in the plea allocution established that defendant arrived at the location of the shooting in a motor vehicle, that defendant was aware that there was a loaded firearm in that vehicle, and that defendant had “ ‘dominion or control’ over the [firearm] by a sufficient level of control over the area” (People v Manini, 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992]). The plea allocution established that defendant possessed the firearm before the altercation that led to the shooting, and thus “there was a completed possession, within the meaning of [section 265.03 (3)], before the shooting took place” (People v Evans, 132 AD3d 1398, 1399 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1087 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Rodriguez, 118 AD3d 451, 452 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 964 [2014]).

As defendant further contends, and the People correctly concede, defendant's waiver of the right to appeal is invalid (see People v Bisono, 36 NY3d 1013, 1017-1018 [2020]; People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545, 564-566 [2019], cert denied 589 US 1302 [2020]). We nevertheless conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court