PEOPLE v. STEPHENS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the case is held, the decision is reserved, and the matter is remitted to Onondaga County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [1]), among other offenses, defendant contends that County Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds based on alleged discovery violations (see CPL 30.30). According to defendant, the People failed to comply with their initial discovery obligations under CPL 245.20 (former [1]) by failing to disclose relevant evidence in their possession when the initial certificate of compliance (COC) was filed, and the court should therefore have struck the COC and deemed the People's statement of readiness illusory. We agree, but before we reach that issue, we address defendant's challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

Defendant contends that the conviction of assault in the second degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence with respect to the elements of physical injury and intent to cause physical injury, and that the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence with respect to the element of intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another. However, those contentions are not preserved for our review inasmuch as defendant did not challenge the evidence related to those elements in his motion for a trial order of dismissal (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]).

In any event, those contentions lack merit. The victim in question suffered a stab wound, requiring staples and stitches, and bite marks. She had permanent scarring from those injuries. We thus conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish impairment of physical condition (see Penal Law § 10.00 [9]; see e.g. People v Myers, 87 AD3d 826, 827 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 954 [2011]; People v Williams, 115 AD2d 333, 333 [4th Dept 1985], lv denied 67 NY2d 891 [1986]). With respect to the intent elements, defendant contends that his intoxication rendered him unable to form the intent necessary for assault or criminal possession. Generally, “a determination whether intoxication is sufficient to negate intent is a question for the trier of fact to resolve in weighing the evidence” (People v Engles, 243 AD3d 1238, 1239 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1065 [2026]). “Although there was evidence at trial that defendant consumed a significant quantity of alcohol on the night of the incident,” it was for the jury “to decide if the extent of the intoxication acted to negate the element of intent” (People v Martinez, 73 AD3d 1432, 1433 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 807 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that defendant had the requisite intent, with respect to assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

We also reject defendant's challenge to the weight of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).

We next address defendant's contention that the court erred in denying his CPL 30.30 motion. Where, as here, “a defendant bring[s] a CPL 30.30 motion to dismiss on the ground that the People failed to exercise due diligence and therefore improperly filed a COC, the People bear the burden of establishing that they did, in fact, exercise due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the initial COC despite a belated or missing disclosure” (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 213 [2023]; see People v Ernst, 240 AD3d 1252, 1253-1254 [4th Dept 2025]). “If the prosecution fails to make such a showing, the COC should be deemed improper, the readiness statement stricken as illusory, and—so long as the time chargeable to the People exceeds the applicable CPL 30.30 period—the case dismissed” (Bay, 41 NY3d at 213; see Ernst, 240 AD3d at 1254).

Here, it is undisputed that the People failed to provide defendant with fundamental, “ ‘routinely produced disclosure materials,’ which were in the possession of the People and would have been readily apparent to a prosecutor exercising due diligence” (People v Mitchell, 228 AD3d 1250, 1257 [4th Dept 2024]; see generally CPL 245.50 [former (1)]; Bay, 41 NY3d at 215). Specifically, when they filed the COC, the People failed to disclose written statements that multiple witnesses made to the police shortly after the crimes were committed, a 911 recording, and defendant's booking video. Those items of evidence are subject to automatic disclosure under CPL 245.20 (1) (former [e]) and (g). The witness statements were disclosed more than five months after the COC was filed, the 911 recording was disclosed one year after the COC was filed, and the booking video had not been disclosed at the time defendant filed his speedy trial motion, even though it had been in the People's possession and control all along.

In opposing defendant's motion, the prosecutor, who had only recently been assigned to the case, stated that it was “possible” that the People did not have the 911 recording in their possession at the time of the initial COC. No further details were provided with respect to when the People obtained the recording, but the prosecutor conceded that it had not been disclosed immediately after the People received it. With respect to the written witness statements, the prosecutor could give no explanation for the lapse in disclosure, contending that the failure was due to “oversights” by the prosecutor who had previously handled the case. With respect to the booking video, the prosecutor contended that it was not common practice to upload booking videos to the discovery portal; instead, those videos were usually made available for the defense to view at the district attorney's office. The prosecutor provided no examples of any exercise of due diligence by the People with respect to those lapses.

In denying defendant's motion, the court stated that striking the COC would be an “extreme” remedy. Although the court precluded the People from offering the 911 recording at trial, presumably as a discovery sanction under CPL 245.80, it failed to address “the key question” of whether the People, despite their admitted failure to disclose relevant evidence, “ ‘exercis[ed] due diligence and ma[de] reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery’ ” (Bay, 41 NY3d at 211, quoting CPL 245.50 [former (1)]).

Before addressing the due diligence issue, we note that the People assert, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that defendant's speedy trial motion was untimely because defendant failed to notify them of the missing evidence “as soon as practicable” (CPL 245.50 [former (4) (b)]). The People point to the fact that defendant filed his speedy trial motion more than six months after the witness statements were disclosed and only five days before his trial began. Because the court did not deny the motion on the ground that it was untimely, however, we are precluded from affirming on that ground (see People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 195-196 [2011]; People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470, 474 [1998], rearg denied 93 NY2d 849 [1999]; see generally CPL 470.15 [1]).

Based upon our review of the Bay factors, many of which are now codified in CPL 245.50 (5) (a), and applying “a holistic assessment of the People's efforts to comply with the automatic discovery provisions, rather than a strict item-by-item test” (People v Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216, 1220 [4th Dept 2024], citing Bay, 41 NY3d at 212-213), we conclude that “the People failed to show that they had exercised due diligence and made reasonable efforts to identify mandatory discovery prior to filing their initial COC, and therefore the initial COC was not proper when filed and the People's declaration of readiness at that time was illusory” (People v Mitchell, 236 AD3d 1331, 1332 [4th Dept 2025]; see People v Baker, 229 AD3d 1324, 1327-1328 [4th Dept 2024]).

Specifically, the case against defendant was not unusually complex; it should have been obvious to the prosecutor that the witness statements existed and should have been disclosed when the COC was filed; the People offered no explanation for their failure to turn over those statements in a timely manner; and the statements were not the only evidence subject to automatic disclosure that the People failed to disclose in a timely manner. Moreover, when the People belatedly disclosed the witness statements (more than five months after the COC was filed), they did not file a supplemental COC, as required by CPL 245.50 (1). Recognizing that CPL article 245 “does not require or anticipate a ‘perfect prosecutor’ ” (Bay, 41 NY3d at 212), we nevertheless conclude that the People failed to meet their burden of establishing that they exercised due diligence with respect to their initial discovery obligations.

We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court to determine whether the People were ready within the requisite time period (see People v Joyner-Pounds, 248 AD3d 1683, 1685 [4th Dept 2026]; Baker, 229 AD3d at 1328). In light of our determination, we do not address defendant's remaining contentions.