STACHE INVESTMENTS CORPORATION PLAINTIFF RESPONDENT v. LEONARD CIOLEK DEFENDANT APPELLANT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover against defendant for his failure to make payments pursuant to a promissory note. Before trial, the parties stipulated that defendant executed a line of credit in an amount up to $600,000 and a pledge and security agreement (collectively, Loan Documents), which provided, inter alia, security for the payment and performance of defendant's obligations under the note. The parties also stipulated to defendant's default under the promissory note. As relevant to this appeal, the issue for trial was whether defendant could prove a mutual mistake in drafting the Loan Documents such that they would be subject to reformation to make the loan a non-recourse obligation pursuant to which defendant would not be required to personally repay the note. Following a nonjury trial, Supreme Court concluded that defendant failed to prove his mutual mistake defense by clear and convincing evidence and issued an order and judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendant now appeals from the subsequently entered statement for judgment. We affirm.

On an appeal following a nonjury trial, this Court “has authority ․ as broad as that of the trial court ․ and ․ may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts” (Village Green E. Holdings LLC v Blaakman, 220 AD3d 1214, 1215 [4th Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]), but “deference is still afforded to the findings of the [court] where, as here, they are based largely on credibility determinations” (Williams v State of New York, 187 AD3d 1522, 1522 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 909 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Cianchetti v Burgio, 145 AD3d 1539, 1540-1541 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 908 [2017]). Moreover, “the decision of the fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Unger v Ganci [appeal No. 2], 200 AD3d 1604, 1605 [4th Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Thoreson v Penthouse Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 495 [1992], rearg denied 81 NY2d 835 [1993]; Dennis v Cerrone, 229 AD3d 1116, 1118 [4th Dept 2024]). When conducting such a review, “we must view the record in the light most favorable to sustain the judgment” (Cianchetti, 145 AD3d at 1541 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

We reject defendant's contention that the court misapplied the clear and convincing evidence standard for reformation of a contract based on mutual mistake. “A party seeking reformation must establish by clear and convincing evidence not only that [mutual] mistake ․ exists, but exactly what was really agreed upon between the parties” (LaMarca v Kissell, 269 AD2d 835, 836 [4th Dept 2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see generally Iskalo Elec. Tower LLC v Stantec Consulting Servs., Inc., 219 AD3d 1157, 1160 [4th Dept 2023]). That standard “forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory” (George Backer Mgt. Corp. v Acme Quilting Co., 46 NY2d 211, 220 [1978] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the testimony at the nonjury trial was equivocal as to whether there was an actual agreement between the parties that defendant would not be personally responsible to repay the loan, and we conclude that the court's rejection of that defense is based on a fair interpretation of the evidence (see Rivera v TRW Tit. Ins. of N.Y., 309 AD2d 740, 740-741 [2d Dept 2003]; see generally Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; Cianchetti, 145 AD3d at 1540-1541).

Defendant contends that the court's determination that he did not establish the mutual mistake defense by clear and convincing evidence is inconsistent with this Court's decision in defendant's prior appeal in this matter, in which we concluded that the court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint inasmuch as defendant raised a triable issue of fact with respect to the issue of mutual mistake (Stache Invs. Corp. v Ciolek, 174 AD3d 1393 [4th Dept 2019]). We reject that contention. This Court “is not bound by the doctrine of law of the case made on pretrial motions in reviewing a full record after trial” (Cushman & Wakefield v 214 E. 49th St. Corp., 218 AD2d 464, 468 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 816 [1996], appeal dismissed 88 NY2d 951 [1996] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “[P]roof offered to defeat a motion for summary judgment does not meet the standard of proof required to resolve an issue of fact at trial” (id.).

Finally, to the extent that it is preserved, we reject defendant's contention that the court erred in precluding evidence of communications and conduct between the parties that occurred after the Loan Documents were executed. “[T]rial courts are accorded wide discretion in making evidentiary rulings ․ [and,] absent an abuse of discretion, those rulings should not be disturbed on appeal” (Mazella v Beals, 27 NY3d 694, 709 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, “[a]n error in a ruling of the court shall be disregarded if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced” (CPLR 2002; see Mazella, 27 NY3d at 711; Senycia v Vosseler, 217 AD3d 1520, 1522 [4th Dept 2023]). Even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in precluding the challenged evidence, we conclude that the error is harmless under the circumstances of this case inasmuch as the excluded evidence would not “have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict” (Czerniejewski v Stewart-Glapat Corp., 269 AD2d 772, 773 [4th Dept 2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Towne v Burns, 125 AD3d 1471, 1471-1472 [4th Dept 2015]; Mancuso v Koch [appeal No. 2], 74 AD3d 1736, 1737 [4th Dept 2010]).

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court