THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK RESPONDENT v. ADRIEL RILEY JR DEFENDANT APPELLANT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him, as a juvenile offender, upon a nonjury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 20.00, 125.25 [1]), defendant contends that his conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence establishing that he had the intent to kill the victim. We reject that contention. “It is well settled that, even in circumstantial evidence cases, the standard for appellate review of legal sufficiency issues is ‘whether any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the fact finder on the basis of the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People’ ” (People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 62 [2001], rearg denied 97 NY2d 678 [2001]; see People v Hancock, 229 AD3d 1229, 1230 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1020 [2024]). With respect to accessorial liability, a person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person that constitutes an offense “when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, [they] solicit[ ], request[ ], command[ ], importune[ ], or intentionally aid[ ] such person to engage in such conduct” (Penal Law § 20.00; see People v Scott, 25 NY3d 1107, 1109-1110 [2015]; People v McDonald, 172 AD3d 1900, 1901 [4th Dept 2019]). Intent in that regard “may be inferred from defendant's conduct as well as the circumstances surrounding the crime” (McDonald, 172 AD3d at 1901-1902), and the factfinder may properly infer that a defendant “intended the natural and probable consequences” of their acts (People v Barboni, 21 NY3d 393, 405 [2013]; see McDonald, 172 AD3d at 1902; People v Hough, 151 AD3d 1591, 1593 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 950 [2017]).

Here, recovered video from the codefendant's cell phone depicts defendant wielding a shotgun in the victim's apartment minutes before the victim was set on fire, multiple lighters and bottles of ignitible liquid, including charcoal starter fluid, were recovered from the victim's apartment, and defendant admitted to being present in the victim's apartment when the victim was on fire. The People presented testimony from a fire investigator who opined that the victim had been intentionally ignited in his living room with an “open flame and combustible materials.” Surveillance video also showed, and multiple witnesses testified that, after the victim ran outside while still burning, with flames a few feet in the air, defendant merely watched without rendering aid. Then, once the fire was extinguished by passersby, defendant approached the victim, who was lying on the ground moaning and smoldering, and tried to intimidate the victim into lying about the identity of the individual who had doused him with an accelerant and set him on fire. Defendant further lied to the police when they promptly arrived on the scene, falsely reporting that he witnessed a “crackhead” run from the scene after dousing the victim and lighting him on fire. Moreover, a recording of defendant while he was being held in an interview room depicts him yelling to his codefendant through a concrete wall that, inter alia: he told police officers that another person had set the victim on fire and that he and the codefendant thereafter “tried to help him,” he and his codefendant could serve “30 years” if the police found out what happened, and he would not “fold[ ]” because he was “too street for that.”

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude that the evidence did not merely establish defendant's “presence at the scene of the crime[ ]” (Hancock, 229 AD3d at 1231; cf. People v Slaughter, 83 AD2d 857, 857-858 [2d Dept 1981], affd 56 NY2d 993 [1982]) but, rather, presented a “compelling chain of circumstantial evidence” that had no reasonable explanation other than that defendant notwithstanding his age either actively participated or intentionally aided in the murder (People v Williams, 233 AD3d 1463, 1465 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 1012 [2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also People v Brown, 204 AD3d 1390, 1393 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 985 [2022]). Thus, “there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational [factfinder] could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Bredt, 248 AD3d 1791, 1794-1795 [4th Dept 2026]). Inasmuch as a “defendant may be presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of [their] actions” (People v Stackhouse, 194 AD3d 113, 119 [4th Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Engles, 243 AD3d 1238, 1239 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1065 [2026]; see generally People v Rumble, 58 AD2d 900, 902 [3d Dept 1977], affd 45 NY2d 879 [1978]), the circumstantial evidence here, including that the victim was doused in a flammable liquid and then set on fire was, contrary to defendant's contention, sufficient to support the inference that defendant intended to kill him (see generally People v Exford, 234 AD3d 1252, 1252-1253 [4th Dept 2025]; People v Burton, 215 AD3d 1054, 1059 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 927 [2023]; People v Truitt, 213 AD3d 1145, 1149-1150 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 39 NY3d 1144 [2023]).

For the same reasons, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of murder in the second degree in this nonjury trial (see Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349), we conclude that, although an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, it cannot be said that County Court failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded (see People v Hickey, 171 AD3d 1465, 1465-1466 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1105 [2019]; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). While the evidence was entirely circumstantial, we conclude that “the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the totality of the evidence was that defendant [alone], [or] acting in concert with [the] codefendant,” lit the victim on fire, causing his death (People v Rackover, 239 AD3d 447, 448 [1st Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1013 [2025]; see also People v McGuire, 227 AD3d 1499, 1499-1500 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 971 [2024]).

Defendant further contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's failure to introduce evidence that defendant, inter alia, had “low average” intelligence for a 14 year old and a learning disability. The defense presented at trial by defense counsel, however, was that defendant did not participate in the murder. Inasmuch as “[t]he hazardous nature of pursuing inconsistent defenses is well established, for it not only risks confusing the [factfinder] as to the nature of the defense but also may well taint a defendant's credibility in the eyes of the [factfinder]” (People v McFadden, 161 AD3d 1570, 1572 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1150 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Nauheimer, 142 AD3d 760, 761 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1074 [2016]), defense counsel's decision to focus on defendant's physical participation in the charged crimeChis actus reusCas opposed to either defendant's infancy or alleged mental culpabilityChis mens reaCwas a reasonable and legitimate trial strategy (see McFadden, 161 AD3d at 1572; see generally People v Kohmescher, 228 AD3d 1334, 1335 [4th Dept 2024]). “As long as a defense is based on a reasonable and legitimate strategy under the circumstances and evidence presented, even if unsuccessful, it will not fall to the level of ineffective assistance” (People v Ritchie, 239 AD3d 1262, 1264 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 994 [2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]; People v Singleton, 203 AD3d 1671, 1672-1673 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1074 [2022]).

Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court